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Davis: The Requisite Specificity of Alcoholic Beverage Warning Labels: A

NOTE

THE REQUISITE SPECIFICITY OF
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE WARNING LABELS:
A DECISION BEST LEFT FOR
CONGRESSIONAL DETERMINATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Alcohol has played many roles over the course of history.' Despite alcohol's presence in our society for well over 5,000 years,2 public health advocates are currently questioning whether there is adequate public awareness of the dangers associated with consuming
alcohol.' These advocates seek to promote the imposition of warning
1. See Zamula, Bodily Harm: The Health Effects of Excessive Drinking,20 FDA CON12, 13 (May 1986). Zamula notes the following:
Besides its use as a beverage, at one time or another alcohol has functioned as a
form of money, a sacrament in religious ceremonies, and as an instrument of subjugation-our forefathers used firewater to subdue native Americans. As a drug it has
been used as a mind-altering substance, antidote against snake-bite poisoning, antiemetic, topical disinfectant, anesthetic, diuretic, tonic, and a purported all-purpose
cure-all. Wars, like Pennsylvania's Whiskey Rebellion of 1794, have been fought
over alcohol taxes. The 18th Amendment and The Constitution, which, from 1920
until its repeal in 1933, prohibited the manufacture, sale and transportation of intoxicating liquors, precipitated another type of war, whose lingering effects are still
felt today.

SUMER

Id.
2. See Sanders, We Need Role Models, Not Labels, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1988, at C2,
col. 3.
3. See, e.g., Gordon, Time to Switch, Not Fight, WINE SPECTATOR, Oct. 31, 1987, at
12, col. 1 (advocating that voluntary self-assessment labeling may prove advantageous to wine
manufacturers by placing them in a "positive light" and thereby disarming critics); Rubin,
The Bad News About Booze, 60 Bus. & Soc'y REv. 4 (1987) (equating alcohol with cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, prescription and over-the-counter drugs, aspirin and products containing saccharin); Taylor, It's Time to Put Warnings on Alcohol, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1988,
at B2, col. 4 (recognizing that a "comprehensive strategy" is necessary to eliminate alcohol
problems, and suggesting that health warning labels are an important start); Thurmond,
Should Congress Pass Legislation to Require Warning Labels on Alcoholic Beverages?, N.Y.
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labels on alcoholic beverage containers in order to better inform the
public of these dangers. 4 Their messages are aimed at alcohol manufacturers, despite the recent decline in the amount of per capita consumption 5 and an increased public awareness of the dangers associated with alcohol.8
One result of this public outcry is embodied in the Alcoholic
Beverage Labeling Act of 1988 (the Act) requiring alcohol manufacturers to provide health warning labels on certain products.7 As of
November 18, 1989, all alcoholic beverages manufactured, imported
or bottled for sale or distribution in the United States must contain
the following warning:
Government Warning: (1) According to the Surgeon General,
women should not drink alcoholic beverages during pregnancy because of the risk of birth defects. (2) Consumption of alcoholic beverages impairs your ability to drive a car or operate machinery,
and may cause health problems.
The most important aspect of this federal legislation is its silence with regard to the issue of preempting state law claims challenging the adequacy of alcoholic beverage warnings. 9 Ultimately,
Congress has, by negative implication, left the preemption issue for
Times, July 9, 1986, at B5, col. 4 (claiming that warnings are necessary for informed consumption decisions); Seessel, Should Liquor Have Warning Labels?, Wash. Post, July 2, 1986,
at 23, col. 3 (noting that alcohol warning labels would serve a necessary educational function
regarding the adverse health effects of alcohol).
4. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 3.
5. See Less Booze, More Food, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1987, at A22, col. 1; cf. Annual
Liquor Survey: Why Consumption Is Down, Bus. WK., May 7, 1984, at 120 (attributing annual consumption decline to both the health and fitness boom, and an increase in the concern
over drunk driving).
6. See Awareness of Alcohol Danger Found Growing, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1987, at
A26, col. I. According to a recent Gallup Poll, 87% of those surveyed, as compared to 79
percent in 1982, agreed that alcoholism is a disease. Id. The survey also determined that 69%
of those surveyed, compared with 57% in 1982, "strongly agreed" that alcohol could cause
birth defects. Id. at col. 2. The poll was based on interviews with 1,571 adults around the
country, and contains a margin of error of plus or minus three percentage points. Id. at col. 1.
But see Seessel, supra note 3, at 23, col. 2 (discussing a report from the National Center for
Health which found that Americans are not very knowledgeable about the adverse effects of
alcohol).
7. Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of 1988, §§ 201-210, 27 U.S.C.A. §§ 213-219a
(West Supp. 1989); see also infra notes 38-56 and accompanying text (discussing the Act and
its legislative history).
8. 27 U.S.C.A. § 215(a) (West Supp. 1989).
9. See Infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing the Act's silence regarding
the preemption of failure to warn claims).
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judicial determination. 1 °
In the future, courts faced with "failure to warn" claims will be
forced to determine the issue of whether Congress intended to preempt judicial action in this area." If Congressional silence is interpreted as the passive approval of judicial action, courts will continue
to entertain these suits.' However, even if courts conclude that judicial actions are preempted by this federal legislation, by analogizing
to cases involving cigarette warnings,"3 they may continue to entertain suits which claim injuries resulting from alcohol consumption
which took place prior to the passage of federal alcohol warning legislation. 4 Thus, since it is likely court will continue to entertain failure to warn claims regardless of their conclusions concerning preemption, prior judicial case law would still retain its precedential
value.
Over the past decade, many suits have been brought against alcohol manufacturers for failing to warn of the dangerous propensities of their products.' 5 In most of these cases, the plaintiffs have
10. See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
11. See id.
12. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text (discussing similarities in the preemption language and stated Congressional policies of both the federal alcoholic beverage and
cigarette warning legislation).
14. See, e.g., Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 685 F. Supp 15, 18 (D. Mass. 1988)
(noting that the language of the cigarette legislation does not even hint at retroactive application and that the proper interpretation of the legislation permits the plaintiffs to pursue claims
for failure to warn prior to the effective date of the Act); Gianitisis v. American Brands, Inc.,
685 F. Supp. 853, 859 (D.N.H. 1988) (holding that the federal cigarette labeling legislation
does not preempt claims for inadequate warning which arose prior to the Act's passage); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1496 (D.N.J. 1988) (permitting plaintiff to
"submit[] evidence from which the jury could infer that, prior to 1966 [the effective date of
the Act], ordinary consumers were not adequately informed of the health risks of smoking.");
Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655, 663 (Minn. 1989) (holding that since
the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act does not specifically provide for the retroactive application, it does not preempt a claim based on failure to warn prior to the effective
date of the Act); cf. Cornelison v. Tambrands, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 706, 709-10 (D. Minn. 1989)
(holding that in order to avoid preemption by federal statutory warnings, tampon users carried
the burden of proving use of the product in a state without warnings prior to the effective date
of the federal legislation).
15. See, e.g., Garrison v. Heublein, Inc., 673 F.2d 189, 192 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding no
liability against the manufacturer and distributor of vodka for failing to warn consumers of the
"common propensities" of alcohol); Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 665 F. Supp. 1140 (M.D. Pa.),
vacated, 835 F.2d 510, 517 (3rd Cir. 1987) (holding that a manufacturer has no duty to warn
of risks associated with the prolonged consumption of beer); Hoover v. Jack Daniels Distillery,
No. 87 C 5509 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (concluding that
manufacturer has no duty to warn of the potential health and social dangers resulting from
excessive consumption); Maguire v. Pabst Brewing Co., 387 N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1986) (re-
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relied, in part,16 upon section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts (Restatement).17 The Restatement provides that a manufacturer is strictly liable for physical harm caused to the. consumer even
sponding to certified questions by stating that the manufacturer's beer was not defective absent
a warning as to the effects of various consumption levels on one's driving capabilities);
Desatnik v. Lem Motlow, Prop., Inc., No. 84 C.A. 104 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1986) (LEXIS,
States library, Ohio file) (finding no duty to warn of the possibility that excessive consumption
of whiskey could lead to death); Pemberton v. American Distilled Spirits Co., 664 S.W.2d 690
(Tenn. 1984) (finding no duty to warn since the dangers of excessive consumption of grain
alcohol are commonly known); Russell v. Bishop, No. 88 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 1986)(coneluding that whiskey manufacturer had no duty to warn of the amount of alcohol which could
safely be consumed before legal intoxication resulted); Malek v. Miller Brewing Co., 749
S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (holding brewery not liable for injuries caused by a drunk
driver); Morris v. Adolph Coors Co., 735 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (holding beer
manufacturer not liable since it is commonly known that excessive consumption may impair
those motor skills necessary to safely operate a motor vehicle).
16. Injured plaintiffs have available three separate tort claims on which to challenge the
adequacy of manufacturers' warnings: negligence, breach of warranty and strict liability. See
Barry & DeVivo, The Evolution of Warnings: The Liberal Trend Toward Absolute Product
Liability, 20 FORUM 38, 42 (1984-85); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability For
Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 849 (1973). Although plaintiffs, in an attempt to cover all possible
bases, typically allege many theories of recovery, courts often merge these multifaceted claims
and concentrate exclusively on the theory of strict liability. See, e.g., Hon, 835 F.2d at 514-17;
Desatnik, No. 84 C.A. 104, slip op. at *2-3; Pemberton, 664 S.W.2d at 692-93; Malek, 749
S.W.2d at 522-23; see also Garrison, 673 F.2d at 190 (noting that the failure to establish a
duty to warn under strict liability, the theory with the lowest threshold burden of proof, undercuts the viability of plaintiffs other theories); Barry & DeVivo, supra, at 43-44 (describing the
dominance of strict liability in warning cases); Wade, supra, at 849-50 (describing the steady
erosion of the independence of negligence, breach of warranty and strict liability claims). See
generally Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
REV. 791 (1966) [hereinafter Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel] (tracing the fall of the privity
doctrine and evolution of strict products liability).
This Note confines its examination to alcohol manufacturers' duty to warn in the context
of strict liability as provided for in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), due
to the significant emphasis placed upon the doctrine of strict liability and the vast judicial
acceptance of § 402A of the Restatement throughout the country. See infra note 74 (listing
jurisdictions which follow the Restatement).
17. Section 402A of the Restatement provides, in pertinent part:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer ... is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to
the ultimate user or consumer

. . .

if

(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A (1965).
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though the manufacturer has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of its product. 18 If alcoholic beverages are proven to
be "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer,"' 9 manufacturers will be required to give adequate warnings of such dangers in order to escape liability.2 0 The majority of
court decisions, however, have held that alcohol manufacturers are
not strictly liable for failing to have health warning labels on their
products. 2x In reaching their decisions, courts have relied predominantly on the comments to the Restatement, which cite alcohol as an
example of a product which is neither defective,22 nor unreasonably
dangerous,23 since the dangers inherent in its consumption are generally known and recognized.2 4
Despite these decisions, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co.,25 and the Texas Court of Appeals
in Brune v. Brown Forman Corp.,26 have recently challenged the position taken by the Restatement and prior case law.27 These courts
concluded that the health hazards associated with alcohol consumption are not necessarily a matter of public knowledge, and the determination of which dangers are commonly known is a question of fact
for the jury to decide.2 8 In light of the consistency with which prior
judicial decisions have concluded that alcohol manufacturers have no
duty to warn as a matter of law,2 9 the reasoning of these two cases
cannot avoid being called into question.
Part II of this Note begins by examining the events leading up
to, and the current status of, federally mandated warning labels.3a
18.

See id. § 402A(2)(a).

19. Id. § 402A(l).
20. See id. comment h; see also infra note 78 (setting forth comment h).
21.

See infra notes 92-124 and accompanying text.

22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comments h & j (1965); infra note
78 (setting forth comments h and j). For a further discussion of the courts' interpretations of
comments h & j, see infra text accompanying notes 92-124.

23. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 402A comment i (1965), infra note 81

(setting forth comment i). For a further discussion of the courts' interpretations of comment i,
see infra text accompanying notes 92-124.
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comments i & j (1965); infra note

78 (setting forth comment j); infra note 81 (setting forth comment i).
25.
26.

835 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1987).
758 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).

27. See infra notes 125-92 and accompanying text (analyzing case law holding that alcohol manufacturers have a duty to warn).

28. See infra notes 131-51, 172-78 and accompanying text.
29.

See, e.g., cases cited supra note 15.

30. See infra notes 38-56 and accompanying text.
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Although the Act does not explicitly preempt state failure to warn
claims, an examination of the policies underlying this legislation fosters the conclusion that such claims were intended to be preempted.31 Part III examines the Restatement32 and the rationale behind the majority of cases holding that alcohol manufacturers are
not strictly liable for failing to provide health warning labels.33 After
this explanation, the problems presented in the courts' reasoning in
Hon and Brune are demonstrated 34 and the natural consequences
which will inevitably result from these two decisions.3 5 Finally, this
Note concludes in Part IV with the recommendation that courts give
little deference to Hon and Brune in any future failure to warn cases
and should therefore conclude, as a matter of law, that the dangers
associated with consuming alcoholic beverages are generally known
and recognized. 6 A consequence of giving little deference to Hon
and Brune is that courts will not induce manufacturers to voluntarily
provide additional warnings on their products in order to avoid liability in the future. As a result, courts will, in effect, be deferring the
decision concerning the requisite specificity of alcoholic beverage
warning labels to Congress, a body which is better suited to make
such a-determination.3 7
II.
A.

CONGRESS' ROLE

Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of 1988

On October 22, 1988, after nearly a full decade of unsuccessful
attempts,38 Congress passed the Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of
31. See infra notes 57-69 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 70-91 accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 92-124 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 138-51, 172-92 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 157-66, 190-92 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 193-202 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
38. The first major effort regarding federal health warnings occurred in May, 1979
when, during consideration of the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention,
Treatment and Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1979, the Senate passed an amendment
requiring all alcoholic beverages containing more than 24% alcohol contain the following
warning: "Caution: Consumption of alcoholic beverages may be hazardous to your health." S.
440, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 9980-92 (1979); see National Council on AlcoholIsm, Federal Action to Require Health Warning Labels on Alcoholic Beverages . See generally Wehr, Industry to Fight Amendment: Senate Votes for Warning Labels on Liquor, 37
CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 964 (May 19, 1979) (describing the bill's history in detail).
In the House-Senate Conference on S. 440, however, a compromise was reached which
required a joint report by the Departments of the Treasury and Health, Education, and Welfare concerning the methods to inform the public of the health hazards associated with con-
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1988." The Act mandates that a federal health warning label be
placed on all alcoholic beverages40 manufactured, imported, or bottled4 1 for sale or distribution in the United States. 2 Congress stated
that a clear, nationally uniform warning is necessary in order to "resuming alcohol. See

SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSP., REPORT ON S.

2047, ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE LABELING, S. REP. No. 596, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988)
[hereinafter SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT]. In their report, both departments recommended
against federal action, claiming that it was not clear whether warning labels could effectively
convey the health risks associated with consuming alcohol. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY
AND

U.S.

DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 96TH CONG., 2D SESs., REPORT TO THE PRES-

IDENT AND THE CONGRESS ON HEALTH HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH ALCOHOL AND METHODS

TO INFORM THE GENERAL PUBLIC OF THESE HAZARDS 41 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter
ALCOHOL REPORT]. Moreover, the departments feared that adding alcohol to the list of prod-

ucts currently carrying warning labels might cause the public to be saturated with warnings,
and thereby reduce their effectiveness. Id.
The issue of alcohol warning labels remained dormant until May 1986, when the Alcohol,
Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Amendments of 1986, was introduced and referred to the
Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee for consideration. S.2595, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess., 132 CONG. REC. 87 (1986). The Committee unanimously adopted an amendment requiring all alcoholic beverages to contain a series of alternating warning labels. See STAFF OF
SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, 99TH CONG., 2d Sess., Report on Alcohol,
Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Amendments of 1986, at 13 (Comm. Print 1986). The required labels included:
Warning: The Surgeon General has determined that the consumption of this
product, which contains alcohol, during pregnancy may cause birth defects.
Warning: Drinking this product, which contains alcohol, can impair your ability to drive a car or operate heavy machinery.
Warning: This product contains alcohol and is particularly hazardous in combination with some drugs.
Warning: The consumption of this product, which contains alcohol, can increase the risk of developing hypertension, liver disease and cancer.
Id. at 14. Significantly, the Committee emphasized that although the proposed legislation
would preempt a state's ability to require additional health warnings, it did not intend to preempt state law claims challenging the adequacy of warnings. Id.; Rubin, supra note 3, at 6.
Due primarily to parliamentary maneuvers by senators interested in protecting the alcoholic
beverage industry, however, the proposal died before reaching the Senate floor during the 99th
Congress. See Britt, Alcohol Manufacturers'Duty to Warn, 38 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 247, 261
(Spr. 1988); Rubin, supra note 3, at 6.
39. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4518 (1988) (codified at 27 U.S.C.A. §§ 213-219a
(West Supp. 1989)).
40. All beverages containing more than one-half of one percent of alcohol by volume
must bear a warning. 27 U.S.C.A. § 214(1) (West Supp. 1989). While distilled spirits, beer,
wine and wine coolers fall within the scope of the federal legislation, cough syrups and other
medicinal products which contain alcohol are excluded. SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 38, at 5.
41. By its terms, the federal warning legislation imposes the obligation to affix warning
labels on manufacturers, rather than on wholesalers or retailers whose only roles are to sell
finished products. SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 38, at 6. But cf. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (imposing strict liability on "sellers" of defective products
which are unreasonably dangerous).
42. 27 U.S.C.A. § 215(a) (West Supp. 1989).
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mind" the public of the health hazards associated with consuming or
abusing alcoholic beverages.43
As of November 18, 1989,"" all alcoholic beverages whose manufacture and sale affects interstate commerce" must bear a statement that warns the consumer of the dangers of consuming alcohol
during pregnancy, before operating a car or heavy machinery, and of
the risk that alcohol may cause health problems.46 The warning is to
appear in a "conspicuous and prominent place" on the container,47
so as to ensure that it is noticed by all consumers.4 8 A manufacturer's failure to comply with these warning requirements could result in the imposition of fines of up to $10,000 for each day that the
43. Id. § 213(1).
44. The legislation provides a twelve month period, from the date of its enactment, for
manufacturers to make adjustments necessary in order to comply with its provisions. See id. §

215(a).
45. Congress noted that it intended to exercise the full scope of its constitutional powers
in order to create a "comprehensive Federal program." Id. § 213. This program is intended to
affect "alcoholic beverages manufactured and sold in or affecting interstate commerce, including those alcoholic beverages manufactured and sold in a single [s]tate." SENATE COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 38, at 5.
Alcoholic beverages manufactured, imported or bottled for export, however, need not bear
the federal warning label provided they are not shipped to members or units of the Armed
Forces stationed outside of the United States. 27 U.S.C.A. § 215(c) (West Supp. 1989).
46. 27 U.S.C.A. § 215(a) (West Supp. 1989); supra text accompanying note 8 (setting
forth the Act's warnings). It is important to note that this warning requirement is potentially
subject to change. The Act provides that the Secretary of the Treasury is vested with the
power to ensure that the provisions of the Act are enforced. 27 U.S.C.A. § 215(d)(1)(A)
(West. Supp. 1989). If after two years the Secretary determines, upon investigation and consultation with the Surgeon General, that a change in the warning statement is necessary, the
Secretary can report its findings and recommendations to Congress. Id. § 217. Congress can
then make whatever changes it deems appropriate. See id.; SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT,

supra note 38, at 8.
47. 27 U.S.C.A. § 215(b) (West Supp. 1989). The warning must appear on the "innermost sealed container" in which the beverage is placed. Id. § 214(5). Therefore, warnings
appearing on cardboard containers in which alcoholic beverages are contained will not absolve

a manufacturer of liability.
48, The term "all consumers" is perhaps over-expansive. The federal warning legislation
applies only to "sealed" containers. See id. § 214(5). Therefore, individuals consuming alcoholic beverages in bars and other alcohol serving establishments will not be apprised of this

warning.
If courts determine that by enacting the federal legislation, Congress intended to preempt
state products liability claims, see infra notes 55-69 and accompanying text, an open question
exists as to whether claims brought by consumers who never saw the warning, but who allege
that the manufacturer failed to effectively warn them of the dangers through, for example, an'
alternative medium, will also be preempted. See Note, Mitigating Alcohol Health Hazards
Through Health Warning Labels and Public Education, 63 WASH. L. REv. 979, 995 (1988)
(authored by Elizabeth L. Kruger) [hereinafter Note, Mitigating Alcohol Health Hazards]

(posing the question of whether manufacturers should be required to constructively warn or
should be required to effectively warn consumers).
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951

violation exists, 49 and an injunction to prevent further violations.50
B. Preemption
In passing the Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act, Congress
stressed the need for national uniformity in health hazard warning
requirements." Congress recognized that permitting states to independently propose their own requirements might lead to the dissemination of incorrect or misleading information, and result in the burdening of interstate commerce.5 2 In order to avoid these problems,
Congress expressly stated that the Act preempts all state legislative
attempts to mandate a different warning label requirement." The
Act, however, does not affect a state's ability to regulate other mediums through which alcohol warnings can be disseminated. 4
49. 27 U.S.C.A. § 218 (West Supp.

1989); SENATE CoMImTFEE REPORT,

supra note 38,

at 4.
50. 27 U.S.C.A. § 219(a) (West Supp. 1989).
51. Id. § 213; see infra note 62 (setting forth Congress' motivation for enacting such

warning requirements).
52.

Id.

53. Id. § 216. The Act provides that "[n]o statement relating to alcoholic beverages and
health, other than the statement required by section 215 of this title, shall be required under
State law to be placed on any container of an alcoholic beverage, or on any box, carton, or
other package ... that contains such a container." Id.
54. SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 38, at 7. For example, both states and
localities can require warning posters to be displayed in bars and other establishments which
serve alcohol. See id. Currently, both the State of New York and the City of Philadelphia
require alcohol servers to display signs warning against fetal alcohol syndrome. AMERICAN
BAR AssOCIATION, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ON YOUTH ALCOHOL AND DRUG PROBLEMS

86-87 n.415 (1985 & 1986 Supp.). Additionally, states are free to require sealed alcoholic
beverage retailers to post "point-of-sale" warnings. See SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT,supra
note 38, at 7; cf. Note, supra note 48, at 990 n.64 (describing "point-of-sale" warnings as a
"recent trend" in warning requirements).
Television advertising is another medium which states may employ to disseminate warnings. Some courts and commentators recognize that commercial advertising promoting alcohol
consumption may lower consumer perceptions of the dangers associated with consuming alcohol. See, e.g., Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 835 F.2d 510, 514-15 (3d Cir. 1987); Note, A Spirited Call to Require Alcohol Manufacturers to Warn of the Dangerous Propensities of their
Products, 11 NOVA L.J. 1611, 1625-27 (1987) (authored by Donna D'Amico) [hereinafter
Note, A Spirited Call]. However, banning alcohol advertising may confront first amendment
constitutional barriers. See Note, The First Amendment and Legislative Bans of Liquor and
Cigarette Advertisements, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 632 (1985) (authored by Matthew L. Miller)
[hereinafter Note, The First Amendment]; Note, Restraints on Alcoholic Beverage Advertising: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 779 (1985) (authored by Karen L.
Sterchi) [hereinafter Note, Restraints on Alcoholic Beverage Advertising]; Note, Liquor Advertising: Resolving the Clash Between the First and Twenty-First Amendments, 59 N.Y.U.
L.REV. 157 (1984) (authored by Richard S. Mandel); Note, Alcoholic Beverage Advertising
and the First Amendment, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 861 (1983) (authored by John Sackett); Note,
Tension Between the First and Twenty - First Amendments in State Regulation of Alcohol
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The most important aspect of the Act, however, is its silence
with regard to whether or not it preempts judicial claims challenging
the adequacy of warnings. Although the Act's legislative history supports arguments on both sides of the preemption issue,55 it provides
no solution. Even those members of Congress who were instrumental
in getting the legislation enacted cannot agree on this issue.5" UltiAdvertising, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1421 (1984) (authored by Brian S. Steffey); see also Tiajoloff,
Is Advertising Protected Under the First Amendment?, 58 Wis. B. BULL, Aug. 1985, at 14
(noting that opponents of the federal cigarette advertising ban consider the legislation an aberration of first amendment rights). But cf. Note, We Can Share the Women, We Can Share the
Wine: The Regulation of Alcohol Advertising on Television, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1107 (1985)
(authored by Marc L. Sherman) (concluding that limited federal regulation designed to prohibit advertising which encourages the consumption of alcohol is constitutional). Counter-advertising, a system which permits equal broadcasting time for commercials depicting the negative aspects of alcohol consumption, is thought to raise far fewer constitutional issues. See
Note, The First Amendment, supra, at 652-55; Note, Restraints on Alcoholic Beverage Advertising, supra, at 794.
55. When the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation originally
passed the Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Bill, they stated that it "preempts State law requiring
the imposition of statements relating to alcoholic beverages and health" on all beverage containers. SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 38, at 7. It may be argued that a question
arises as to whether the scope of the term "State law requiring" is to be read narrowly so as to
merely encompass legislation, or rather it is to be given a broader reading which also encompasses judicial interpretation. When a court permits plaintiffs with failure to warn claims to
reach the jury, they are, by implication, requiring manufacturers to voluntarily warn consumers of the dangers associated with consuming their products. See infra note 198 and accompanying text. Thus, since the judicial interpretation of state law may impliedly require the imposition of warning labels, this action may fall within the guise of the Act's preemption language
if given a broad meaning. However, the very next sentence in the Act's legislative history
states that "[ihe provision should not be read to indicate that the states do not have the
authority in other areas to impose standards to protect the health and safety of their citizens
from hazards associated with the products they consume." SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 38, at 7. Although warning posters are cited as an example, see id., perhaps failure to
warn suits constitute "other areas" for which a state may still retain control. If this is true,
state judiciaries would, arguably, not be preempted from hearing failure to warn claims, and
the terms "State law requiring" in the preceding sentence, would merely refer to legislative
action.
56. Compare 134 CONG. REc. S16008 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Senator
Thurmond) (stating that the Act's preemption is narrow and does not prevent the alcoholic
beverage industry from voluntarily providing additional warnings) and 134 CONG. REC.
S16009 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Senator Hollings) (stating that the provision is
very narrow: no state can require health warning labels on containers, but other state prerogatives are not preempted) and 134 CONG. REc. E3763-64 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988) (statement
of Representative Conyers) (stating that "the preemption provision of this bill does not preempt any State tort or common law remedies for personal injury or property damage based on
a failure to warn theory," and "the bill does not prevent manufacturers, distributors, or sellers
of alcoholic beverages from voluntarily using more stringent warnings in their labeling for
whatever reason, including their concern for consumers' welfare or their desire to satisfy State
tort or common law standards.") with 134 CONG. REC. S17300-01 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988)
(statement of Senator Ford) (stating that Congress possesses the exclusive power to regulate
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mately, Congress has, by negative implication, left the preemption
issue for judicial determination.
Although the Act is silent on the issue of preemption, this Note
argues that courts should find state "failure to warn" claims preempted. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution58 permits the
laws of the United States to preempt state law.5 Thus, the key question one must ask is "whether Congress intended that federal regulation supersede state law." 60
While Congress' intent concerning preemption is not explicit, a
careful examination of the policies behind the enactment of the
Act 61 leads to the conclusion that Congress intended to preempt such
claims. This examination is best conducted by comparing the reasons
stated for enacting the alcoholic beverage labeling legislation 2 with
labeling of alcoholic beverages and no state, through legislation or judicial interpretation, may
require a different warning) and 134 CONG. Rac. E3729 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988) (statement
of Representative Waxman) (stating that "the legislation does not affect the duty that manufacturers, bottlers, and sellers of alcoholic beverages have to inform and warn the public" and
"the legislation does not preclude manufacturers from voluntarily providing consumers of alcoholic beverages information about the adverse health effects of alcoholic beverages including
the placement of additional warning statements or disclaimers on container labels."). Representative Waxman further noted that there cannot "be any question about the authority of
courts to enter judgments with respect to warnings other than those directly on the labels of
containers." Id.
57. See 134 CONG. REC. E3729 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988) (statement of Representative
Waxman) (noting that "[i]n the passage of this legislation was not Congress' intent to affect
the liability of manufacturers either positively or negatively. The Congress intended that any
implications to be drawn from a manufacturer's compliance with this legislation are left to the
discretion and interpretation of the courts.").
58. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl.
2. The Supremacy Clause provides, in relevant part:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; . . .shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
59. See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355 (1986). In Louisiana
Public Service Commission, the Court noted that implied preemption can exist when federal
and state law actually conflict; where compliance with both laws is physically impossible; when
federal law acts as a barrier to state law; where federal legislation is comprehensive and
thereby occupies the entire field of regulation; or where state law interferes with the execution
of Congress' objectives. 476 U.S. at 368-69.
60. Id. at 369.
61. See infra note 62 (setting forth the policies behind the enactment of the federal
alcoholic beverage warning legislation).
62. The purposes stated by Congress for enacting the Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act
of 1988 were, in pertinent part, as follows:
The Congress finds that the American public should be informed about the
health hazards that may result from the consumption or abuse of alcoholic beverages, and has determined that it would be beneficial to provide a clear, nonconfusing

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1990

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 13
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:943

those of the cigarette labeling legislation. 63 The stated Congressional
purposes, in both instances, are remarkably similar.
Despite the fact that the cigarette labeling legislation does not
expressly preempt state law claims,64 several courts have interpreted
reminder of such hazards, and that there is a need for national uniformity in such
reminders in order to avoid the promulgation of incorrect or misleading information
and to minimize burdens on interstate commerce .... It is therefore the policy of
the Congress, and the purpose of this subchapter, to exercise the full reach of the
Federal Government's constitutional powers in order to establish a comprehensive
Federal program .. to deal with the provision of warning or other information with
respect to any relationship between the consumption or abuse of alcoholic beverages
and health, so that(1) the public may be adequately reminded about any health hazards that may
be associated with the consumption or abuse of alcoholic beverages through a nationally uniform, nonconfusing warning notice on each container of such beverages;
and
(2) commerce and the national economy may be(A) protected to the maximum extent consistent with this declared policy,
(B) not impeded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing requirements for warning or other information on alcoholic beverage containers with respect to any relationship between the consumption or abuse of alcoholic beverages and health ....
27 U.S.CA. § 213 (West Supp. 1989).
For the text of the Act's preemption language, see supra note 53.
63. Cf. Hoover v. Jack Daniels Distillery, No. 87 C 5509, at *2 (N.D. I11.Sept 14,
1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist File) (relying upon a cigarette case for the proposition
that future federal alcoholic beverage labeling legislation will probably preempt state failure to
warn claims). The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act mandates the imposition of
health warning labels on all cigarette packages. The Act originally stated its purposes to be as
follows:
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this chapter, to establish a
comprehensive Federal Program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising with
respect to any relationship between smoking and health, whereby(1) the public may be adequately informed that cigarette smoking may be hazardous to health by inclusion of a warning to that effect on each package of cigarettes; and
(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the maximum extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not impeded by diverse,
nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and health.
15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), amended by 15 U.S.C. § 1331(1) (Supp. V 1987).
In 1984, the first paragraph was amended to state the following:
(I) the public may be adequately informed about any adverse health effects of
cigarette smoking by inclusion of warning notices on each package of cigarettes and
in each advertisement of cigarettes. ...
15 U.S.C. § 1331(l) (Supp. V 1987).
In addition, the Act's preemption section states, in pertinent part, the following:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required by section 1333 of this title shall be required on any cigarette package.
15 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1982).
64. See Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 234 (6th Cir. 1988);
Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 625 (Ist Cir. 1987); Stephen v. Ameziican
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Congress' reference to national uniformity and protection of interstate commerce as forbidding state courts from inducing cigarette
manufacturers to voluntarily provide additional warnings.6 5 These
courts have recognized Congress' efforts to balance the policies of
health protection through education with the need to protect the na-

tional economy. 60 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit best
expressed this concept when it stated that "[i]t is inconceivable that
Congress intended to have that carefully wrought balance of national
interests superseded by the views of a single state, indeed, perhaps of
8' 7
a single jury in a single state."
Since the stated Congressional policy behind enacting the alcoholic beverage labeling legislation mirrors that of the cigarette labeling legislation, where courts have recognized Congress' implied intent to preempt failure to warn claims,68 courts in future alcoholic
beverage labeling suits should similarly conclude that these claims
are preempted by the federal alcoholic beverage labeling
legislation.6"
Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312, 313 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 185-86 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987).
65. See, e.g., Roysdon, 849 F.2d at 234 (concluding that since failure to warn claims tip
Congress' balance of purpose, they "actually conflict" with the Act); Palmer, 825 F.2d at 626
(concluding that allowing failure to warn claims "abrogate[s] utterly" Congress' established
scheme of health protection); Stephen, 825 F.2d at 313 (adopting the decision and reasoning
of the Third Circuit in Cipollone); Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187 (recognizing that state failure
to warn claims have the effect of imposing requirements which "actually conflict" with the
Act); Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655, 660 (Minn. 1989) (holding that
"state tort claims based on a state-imposed duty to warn are impliedly preempted."); Gianitsis
v. American Brands, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 853, 859 (D.N.H. 1988) (recognizing that failure to
warn claims disrupt Congress' carefully wrought balance of purpose).
For a discussion of the various effects products liability suits may have on uniformity and
interstate commerce, see infra text accompanying notes 198-202.
66. See Roysdon, 849 F.2d at 234-35; Palmer, 825 F.2d at 626; Cipollone, 789 F.2d at
187; Gianitsis, 685 F. Supp. at 859.
67. Palmer, 825 F.2d at 626.
68. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
69. See 134 CONG. REc. E3729 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988) (statement of Representative
Waxman) (recognizing that courts in future failure to warn cases may well conclude that
penalizing manufacturers for failing to provide additional warnings would be unjustified since
the Act prevents state legislatures from requiring additional warnings in order to promote
uniformity); 134 CONG. REc. S17300-01 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Senator Ford)
(stating that the preemption section of the alcoholic beverage labeling legislation "recognizes
that the effectiveness of the warning label contained in the Act would be diminished if other,
perhaps conflicting, statements were allowed to be added to alcoholic beverage containers.");
see also Note, Liability of Alcoholic Beverage Manufacturers:No Longer a Pink Elephant,
31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 165 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Liability] (authored by Clay
Campbell) (recognizing the potential for state court judgments to upset Congress' desire for
uniformity of alcoholic beverage warning labels).
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JUDICIAL RESPONSE To ALCOHOL LABELING SUITS

Strict Liability Under the Second Restatement

Alcoholic beverages are deemed as "unavoidably dangerous"
products under the Restatement.7 0 "Unavoidably dangerous prod-

ucts" are those which are incapable of being made safe for their

intended use under the present state of scientific knowledge. 71 A
manufacturer, who has undertaken to supply the public with a beneficial and desired, albeit unavoidably dangerous product, does not
automatically become liable for all injury resulting from its use. 2 In
fact, it was precisely to forestall the imposition of such broad liability that the drafters of the Restatement limited a manufacturer's liability to products in a "defective
condition unreasonably dangerous
7
to the user or consumer.1
In order to hold alcohol manufacturers strictly liable under the
Restatement, i. plaintiff must prove that the proximate cause of his
injury was a defect in the product which rendered it unreasonably
dangerous.74 This burden requires proving that the product was both
70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965); Prosser, Strict
Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 23 (1966) [hereinafter Prosser,
Strict Liability]; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, supra note 16, at 807; Wade, Strict Tort
Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 19-20 (1965).
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965). See generally Prosser, Strict Liability, supra note 70, at 23-27 (discussing the application of strict liability theories to various unreasonably dangerous products); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, supra note
16, at 807-14 (providing a detailed analysis of unavoidably dangerous products).
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965); Prosser, Strict
Liability, supra note 70, at 23-27; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, supra note 16, at 807-14;
Wade, supra note 70, at 19-20; see also Note, The Liability of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers for Unforseen Adverse Drug Reactions, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 742-44 (1980) (authored by Kathleen H. Wilson) (discussing the risk-utility test employed in comment k and its
applicability to pharmaceutical products). In discussing whether there should be liability for
these beneficial yet unavoidably dangerous products, Professor Prosser posed the question as
such:
Take whiskey. It is really dreadful stuff. It causes a variety of unpleasant consequences, ranging from delirium tremens and cirrhosis of the liver to drunken driving; and you really should not drink as much of it as you do. Is the maker of good
whiskey-as distinguished from whiskey full of fusel oil, strychnine or old cigar
stubs-to be held liable.., for all the harm that may result from its consumption?
In other words, is the maker who has supplied a popular demand to be held responsible for the drinking habits of the American public? And is the manufacturer of an
automobile to be held liable for the way people drive it?
Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, supra note 16, at 807.
73. Prosser, Strict Liability, supra note 70, at 23; cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A (1965) (setting forth the elements of a strict products liability claim).
74.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1) (1965). The doctrine of strict

products liability as stated in § 402A of the Restatement has been applied and/or explicitly
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in a defective condition and unreasonably dangerous at the time it
left the manufacturer's hands. 5
A product which is flawlessly designed and manufactured"8 may
adopted in the following jurisdictions: Arizona, O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447
P.2d 248 (1968); Colorado, Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983
(1975); Connecticut, Wachtel v. Rosol, 159 Conn. 496, 271 A.2d 84 (1970); District of Columbia, Fisher v. Bell Helicopter Co., 403 F. Supp. 1165 (D.D.C. 1975); Florida, West v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Hawaii, Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car
Corp., 52 Haw. 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970); Idaho, Shields v. Morton Chem. Co., 95 Idaho 674,
518 P.2d 857 (1974); Illinois, Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. and Medical Center, 117 I11.2d
507, 513 N.E.2d 387 (1987); Indiana, Ayr-Way Stores, Inc. v. Chitwood, 261 Ind. 86, 300
N.E.2d 335 (1973); Iowa, Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 199 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa
1972); Kansas, Brooks v. Dietz, 218 Kan. 698, 545 P.2d 1104 (1976); Kentucky, Dealers
Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965); Louisiana, Weber v.
Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971); Maine, Ma. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 221 (1964); Maryland, Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363
A.2d 955 (1976); Minnesota, McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d
488 (1967); Mississippi, State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966), cert.
denied sub nom. Yates v. Hodges, 386 U.S. 912 (1967); Missouri, Keener v. Dayton Elec.
Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969); Montana, Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, 162
Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973); Nebraska, Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428, 191
N.W.2d 601 (1971); Nevada, Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 82 Nev. 439, 420
P.2d 855 (1966); New Hampshire, Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, Inc., 110 N.H. 36, 260
A.2d 111 (1969); New Mexico, Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972);
North Dakota, Johnson v. American Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974); Ohio, Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977); Oklahoma, Kirkland v.
General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974); Oregon, Rice v. Hyster Co., 273 Or. 191,
540 P.2d 989 (1975); Pennsylvania, Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966); Rhode
Island, Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 109 R.I. 176, 283 A.2d 255 (1971); South Carolina,
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-73-10 to 15-73-30 (Law. Co-op. 1976); South Dakota, Engberg v. Ford
Motor Co., 87 S.D. 196, 205 N.W.2d 104 (1973); Tennessee, Gann v. International Harvester
Co., 712 S.W.2d 100 (Tenn. 1986); Texas, McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787
(Tex. 1967); Utah, Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979);
Vermont, Zaleskie v. Joyce, 133 Vt. 150, 333 A.2d 110 (1975); Washington, Ulmer v. Ford
Motor Co., 75 Wash.2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969); Wisconsin, Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d
443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967); Wyoming, Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334 (Wyo.
1986).
75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965); supra note 17. But cf.
Wade, supra note 16, at 830-31 (noting that these phrases are redundant since "defective
condition" is defined in the comments in terms of being unreasonably dangerous).
Controversy exists as to the independent meaning of these two terms. In fact, California
has abandoned the "unreasonably dangerous" terminology. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,
8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). However, the abolition of the phrase
"unreasonably dangerous" has met with opposition. See, e.g., Keeton, Products Liability and
the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 30-32 (noting that when the Supreme Court of
California rejected the unreasonably dangerous requirement and failed to replace it with a
similar notion, they usurped all content from the term defective); Wade, supra note 16, at
829-41 (stating that the position taken by the California court is not sustainable in design and
warning cases since the product defect results from an intentional manufacturing process).
76. A product may be in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous as marketed for
any of the following reasons: (1) a manufacturing defect; (2) a defect in design; or (3) a
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nevertheless be in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" if
it is not accompanied by an adequate warning of the potential dangers inherent in its use. 77 Generally, where manufacturers have reason to anticipate injuries resulting from a particular use of their
product, whether normal or abusive, they may have a duty to warn
potential consumers. 78 A manufacturer's failure to warn of potential
failure by the manufacturer to warn of the risks associated with the use of the product. W.
KEETON, PROSSER & KEEroN ON TORTS § 99, at 695 (5th ed. 1984). A manufacturing defect
is one which causes the product to be dangerous when used in a reasonably expected manner
given the product's nature and intended function. 1 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 4050 (Oct.
1987). A manufacturing defect involves a flaw in the product or a condition that was unintended and makes the product more dangerous than it otherwise would have been if constructed as intended. W. KEETON, supra, § 99, at 695. A product with a design defect, however, is the result of an intended design process and, thus, is in a condition actually
contemplated by the manufacturer. 1 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 4060 (Oct. 1987).
77. Gallub, Limiting the Manufacturer's Duty for Subsequent Product Alteration:
Three Steps to a Rational Approach, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 361, 417 (1988); Note, Product
Liability After Woodill v. Parke Davis: The Failureto Warn as a Basisfor Recovery, 13 Loy.
U. CHI. L.J. 523, 528 (1982) (authored by Sheryl Ann Marcouiller); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965); infra note 78 (setting forth comment j); 1 Prod.
Liab. Rep. (CCH) %4095 (Oct. 1987). For a comprehensive discussion of manufacturers' duty
to provide adequate warnings under the Restatement, see Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in
Products Liability Law-A Review of Basic Principles,45 Mo. L. REv. 579, 586-92 (1980);
Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256,
267-72 (1969).
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment h (1965). Comments h & j of
the Restatement govern a manufacturer's duty to warn. Comment h provides, in pertinent
part:
A product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling
and consumption. If injury results from abnormal handling-. . . or from abnormal
consumption.., the seller is not liable. Where, however, he has reason to anticipate
that danger may result from a particular use, as where a drug is sold which is safe
only in limited doses, he may be required to give adequate warning of the danger
(see Comment j), and a product sold without such warning is in a defective
condition.
Id.
Although alcohol manufacturers have reason to anticipate that danger may result from
abnormal consumption of their products, a manufacturer's duty to warn is subject to comment
j of the Restatement. Comment j states, in pertinent part:
In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller
may be required to give directions or warning, on the container, as to its use....
But a seller is not required to warn with respect to products, or ingredients in
them, which are only dangerous, or potentially so, when consumed in excessive
quantity, or over a long period of time, when the danger, or potentiality of danger, is
generally known and recognized. Again the dangers of alcoholic beverages are an
example, as are also those of foods containing such substances as saturated fats,
which may over a period of time have a deleterious effect upon the heart.
Id. at comment j (emphasis added).
Many courts have relied upon comment j of § 402A in reaching their decisions. See, e.g.,
Alabama, Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134, 143 (Ala. 1976); Alaska, Prince
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dangers could result in a finding that the product is defective."
Strict liability can only be imposed on a manufacturer where
the defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the consumer.80 A product is unreasonably dangerous if it is
dangerous to an extent beyond the contemplation of the ordinary
consumer. 8 ' This fictitious user is charged with the knowledge cornv. Parachutes, Inc., 685 P.2d 83, 87 (Alaska 1984); Arizona, O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103
Ariz. 556, 560, 447 P.2d 248, 252 (1968); Colorado, Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162,
173, 583 P.2d 276, 283 (1978); Connecticut, Tomer v. American Home Prod. Corp., 170
Conn. 681, 689, 368 A.2d 35, 39 (1976); District of Columbia, Payne v. Soft Sheen Prod.,
Inc., 486 A.2d 712, 722 (D.C. 1985); Florida, Giddens v. Denman Rubber Mfg. Co., 440
So.2d 1320, 1322-23 (Fla. 1983); Idaho, Chancler v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 107
Idaho 953, 955, 694 P.2d 1301, 1303 (Idaho Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 109 Idaho
841, 712 P.2d 542 (1985); Illinois, Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 II1. 2d 26, 33-34, 402
N.E.2d 194, 197-98 (1980); Indiana, Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 180 Ind. App.
33, 40-41, 388 N.E.2d 541, 546-47 (1979); Iowa, Cooley v. Quick Supply Co., 221 N.W.2d
763, 768-69 (1974); Kansas, Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 235 Kan. 387, 399400, 681 P.2d 1038, 1048-49, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984); Kentucky, Ulrich v. Kasco
Abrasives Co., 532 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Ky. 1976); Louisiana, Tenneco Oil Co. v. Chicago
Bridge & Iron Co., 495 So. 2d 1317, 1323 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Maine, Bernier v. Raymark
Indus., Inc., 516 A.2d 534, 538 (Me. 1986); Maryland, Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303
Md. 581, 591-95, 495 A.2d 348, 353-55 (1985); Minnesota, Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg., Inc.,
285 Minn. 32, 38-39, 171 N.W.2d 201, 206 (1969); Mississippi, Pridgett v. Jackson Iron &
Metal Co., 253 So. 2d 837, 843 (Miss. 1971); Missouri, Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387,
393 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 803 (1982); Montana, Rost v. C.F. & I. Steel
Corp., 189 Mont. 485, 616 P.2d 383, 385 (1980); Nebraska, McDaniel v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc, 196 Neb. 190, 197-99, 241 N.W.2d 822, 826-27 (1976); New Hampshire, Bellotte v.
Zayre Corp., 116 N.H. 52, 54-55, 352 A.2d 723, 725 (1976); New Jersey, Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories, Div. of Home Prod. Corp., 165 N.J. Super. 311, 398 A.2d 132, 136 (Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1979); New Mexico, Rudisaile v. Hawk Aviation, Inc., 92 N.M. 575, 592 P.2d
175, 176 (1979); North Dakota, Olson v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d 530, 534-35
(N.D. 1977); Ohio, Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 468, 424
N.E.2d 568, 578 (1981); Oklahoma, Smith v. United States Gypsum Co., 612 P.2d 251, 25354 (Okla. 1980); Oregon, Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 496-97, 525 P.2d
1033, 1038 (1974); Pennsylvania, Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 287-88, 282 A.2d 206,
219-20 (1971); Rhode Island, Thomas v. Amway Corp., 488 A.2d 716, 722 (R.I. 1985); Tennessee, Pemberton v. American Distilled Spirits Co., 664 S.W.2d 690, 692-93 (Tenn. 1984);
Texas, Technical Chem. Co. v. W. T. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. 1972); Washington,
Haysom v. Coleman Lantern Co., 89 Wash. 2d 474, 478-79, 573 P.2d 785, 788-89 (1978);
Wisconsin, Krueger v. Tappan Co., 104 Wis. 2d 199, 203-08, 311 N.W.2d 219, 222-24 (Ct.
App. 1981).
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment h (1965).
80. Id. at comment i; see also supra note 76.
81. Id. Comment i explains the "unreasonably dangerous" criteria as follows:
Many products cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all consumption, and any
food or drug necessarily involves some risk of harm, if only from over-consumption. . . . The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would
be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics. Good whiskey is not
unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some people drunk, and is
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mon to the community as to the product's dangerous characteristics. 2 Therefore, where a manufacturer fails to warn the unsuspecting general public of dangers which are both reasonably anticipated
and inherent in the use of the product, the product is deemed to be
in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous," thereby subjecting the manufacturer to strict liability under the Restatement. 3
Not all potentially dangerous products, however, are defective
in the absence of a warning.84 A duty to warn is premised on the
notion that consumers are entitled to have access to information so
that they may intelligently decide whether the product's benefits out-

weigh its potential risks of harm."5 Where the dangers inherent in
the use or abuse of a product are already appreciated by the ordinary consumer, it is clear that a warning serves no viable purpose.8 6
In such an instance, a manufacturer's failure to warn will not result"
87
in strict liability.
Under the strict liability standard set forth in the Restatement,
especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, containing a dangerous
amount of fusel oil, is unreasonably dangerous. Good tobacco is not unreasonably
dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous.
Id. (emphasis added). For a comprehensive examination of the "consumer expectation" test,
see Shapo, A RepresentationalTheory of ConsumerProtection: Doctrine,Function and Legal
Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1370-71 (1974) and Twerski,
From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectations: Enhancing the Role of Judicial Screening in
Products Liability Litigation, 11 HOFSTRA L. REv. 861 (1983). But see Keeton, supra note 77,
at 588-92 (criticizing the consumer expectation test as a measure of defectiveness).
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965).
83. See id. comments h, i & j. See generally Noel, supra note 77, at 267-72, 274 (discussing a manufacturer's duty to warn under § 402A).

84. See, e.g.,

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A comment h (1965). Comment

h notes that where injury results from
abnormal handling, as where a bottled beverage is knocked against a radiator to
remove the cap, or from abnormal preparation for use, as where too much salt is
added to food, or from abnormal consumption, as where a child eats too much
candy and is made ill, the seller is not liable.
Id. Furthermore, Professor Prosser observed that "[flew, if any products, of course, are absolutely safe. Any knife will cut, any hammer wielded unskilled will mash a thumb, any food can
cause indigestion; and no one [sic] supposes that the producer of such things is to be held
liable when someone is hurt." Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, supra note 16, at 807.
85. 1 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 4095 (Oct. 1987).
86. See Noel, supra note 77, at 272; Wade, supra note 16, at 842-43.
87. Under the Restatement, a product is neither defective, nor unreasonably dangerous,
where the manufacturer fails to warn of dangers already contemplated by the ordinary consumer. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comments j & i (1965); see also cases
cited supra note 15 (holding that alcohol manufacturers were not strictly liable under section
402A for failing to warn since the dangers associated with alcohol consumption were already
commonly known).
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alcoholic beverages are products which are neither defective, nor unreasonably dangerous in the absence of a warning.8" The drafters of
the Restatement cited "good whiskey" as an example of a product
which is not unreasonably dangerous since it is not "dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer." 89 Additionally, the Restatement notes that a product
which lacks a warning is not defective where it is "only dangerous,
or potentially so, when consumed in excessive quantity, or over a
long period of time, when the danger, or potentiality of danger, is
generally known and recognized." 90 Moreover, the Restatement cites
the dangers associated with consuming alcoholic beverages as an example of those for which no warning is necessary. 9 As a consequence, the Restatement's position has proven very troublesome for
plaintiffs' attorneys attempting to bring strict liability suits against
alcohol manufacturers for failing to place health warning labels on
their products.
B.

Analysis of Recent Case Law Holding that Alcohol

Manufacturers Have No Duty to Warn
1. Extended Use Cases.- In 1982, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Garrisonv. Heublein, Inc.,92 was
the first court to hold that alcohol manufacturers were not strictly
88. See RESTATEMENT § 402A comments i & j (citing alcohol as an example of a product whose dangers are generally known and recognized); see also cases cited supra note 15.
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965); Desatnik v. Lem
Motlow, Prop., Inc., No. 84 C.A. 104, slip op. at *7-8 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1986)(LEXIS,
States library, Ohio file) (following the Restatement view); Malek v. Miller Brewing Co., 749
S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (following the Restatement view); Britt, supra note 38,
at 250; Note, Liability, supra note 69, at 166-67; Note, A Spirited Call, supra note 54, at
1620-21; Note, Mitigating Alcohol Health Hazards Through Health Warning Labels and
Public Education, supra note 48, at 984; see also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 660 (4th ed. 1971) (noting that whiskey cannot be regarded as unreasonably dangerous
since the dangers associated with its consumption are commonly known).
A "plain meaning" reading of comment i indicates that alcohol manufacturers will only
be strictly liable where their product contains harmful ingredients which are not generally
considered to be present in such products. See infra note 124 (discussing the Ohio Court of
Appeals' "clear meaning" analysis and reliance upon comment i in Desatnik).

90.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A comment j (1965), set forth supra note

78.
91. Id.; see Desatnik, No. 84 C.A. 104, slip op. at *9; Britt, supra note 38, at 252; Note,
A Spirited Call, supra note 54, at 1621; Note, MitigatingAlcohol Health Hazards, supra
note 48, at 985 n.34. But cf. infra text accompanying notes 125-96 (discussing cases in which
plaintiffs attempted to negate this conclusion).
92. 673 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1982).
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liable 3 for failing to warn consumers of the health hazards associated with consuming their products. 9 4 The plaintiffs sued the manufacturer/distributor of Smirnoff vodka alleging that the plaintiff had
"suffered physical and mental injuries as a result of consuming the
defendant's product over a twenty-year period." 95
In affirming the district court's dismissal of the complaint for its
failure to state a claim, the court of appeals based its decision on the
doctrine of strict products liability.98 Relying primarily upon comments h, i and j of the Restatement,"7 the court concluded that "even
though there are dangers involved in the use of alcoholic beverages,
because of the common knowledge of those dangers, the product
cannot be regarded as unreasonably unsafe." '
Five years after Garrison, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois was confronted with a similar issue
93. Note, however, that Garrison is not the first case to challenge the absence of warning labels on alcoholic beverages. In 1977, the United-States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that whiskey was neither misbranded, nor adulterated, within the meaning of the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 334, 351 (1976). Abernathy v. Schenley
Indust., 556 F.2d 242, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1977). The court also concluded that since the manufacturer "had followed federal regulations in having its label approved, it had met its obligation under the statute pertaining to the labeling of intoxicating liquor .... " Abernathy, 556
F.2d at 244 (citations omitted).
94. Garrison, 673 F.2d at 192.
95. Id. at 189. The plaintiff urged five theories for recovery: products liability, negligence, fraud, willful and wanton conduct, and false and misleading advertising. Id. Specifically, each theory rested upon defendant's failure to warn of the product's propensities
to cause physical damage to the consumer . . .[;] to cause impairment to physical
and motor skills for a period of time after consumption ...[;] to cause impairment
to mental capacity and facilities for a period of time after consumption . . .[;] to
affect the personality of the consumer; to be addictive; and to create dangers in the
operation of a motor vehicle.
Id. at 189 n.2.
96. See id. at 189-90. Note that this decision is based upon Illinois law, which had
previously adopted § 402A of the Restatement. Id. at 190; see Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32
Ill. 2d 612, 621-22, 210 N.E.2d 182, 187 (1965); Genaust v. I11.Power Co., 62 I11.2d 456,
462-63, 343 N.E.2d 465, 469 (1976) (recognizing the adoption of § 402A in Suvada); see also
supra note 74 (setting forth jurisdictions who have adopted § 402A).
97. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text (discussing comments h, i and j and
the ways in which they stand for the proposition that the health hazards associated with alcohol are commonly known).
98. Garrison,673 F.2d at 192 (citing W. PROSSER, supra note 89, at 660). The plaintiff
in Garrison relied upon a report prepared by both the United States Departments of Treasury
and Health and Human Services to support the proposition that there are many misconceptions about the dangers associated with alcohol. Id. at 192 n.6; see ALCOHOL REPORT, supra
note 38, at 45. The court held, however, that the report was insufficiently compelling to disturb
its finding that certain health hazards, including those alleged by the plaintiff, were commonly
known to be associated with the consumption of alcohol. Garrison,673 F.2d at 192 n.6.
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involving injuries resulting from the extended consumption of alcohol. In Hoover v. Jack Daniels Distillery,99 the plaintiff sought to
recover for his seven years of alcoholism, and past and continued
suffering of embarrassment and mental anguish from being labeled
an alcoholic. 100 The plaintiff alleged that the manufacturers of Jack
Daniels Whiskey breached their duty to warn consumers that extended use of their product could become addictive.101 The complaint
requested that the defendant be "ordered to properly label its products with adequate warning of the health and social dangers of excessive use. ''x°2

The Hoover court, applying Illinois law,103 reaffirmed the position taken in Garrison by recognizing that the defendant had no
duty to warn the consuming public of dangers which were already
commonly known.10 4 The court dismissed the plaintiff's argument
that, in the five years since Garrison, scientific research had uncovered new health hazards associated with consuming alcoholic beverages.105 The court stated that "[u]ndoubtedly there have been additional clinical findings, but they merely reinforce what has long been
generally known: that alcohol abuse presents very serious public
health hazards."' 106
2. Acute Alcohol Poisoning Cases.- In addition to the extended use cases discussed above,107 suits have been brought claim99. No. 87 C 5509 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
100. Since the court's opinion in Hoover does not discuss the nature of the plaintiff's
allegations, this Note relies upon various secondary sources for this information. See Middleton, Liquor-Label Suit Will Test Warning Issue, NAT'L LAW J., Sept. 22, 1986, at 12; see
also Before the Bar: The Case of Jack Daniel's,NEWSWEEK, Sept. 15, 1986, at 36; Lewin, A
Liquor Issue: Warning Label, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1986, at D2, col. 1.
101. Middleton, supra note 100, at 12; Lewin, supra note 100, at D2, cols. 1-3. The
complaint alleged liability on the part of the defendant based upon the following three theories
of recovery: (1) strict products liability, (2) negligence and (3) willful and wanton conduct.
See Note, A Spirited Call, supra note 54, at 1629 n.142 (quoting Plaintiff's Complaint at 17,
Hoover v. Jack Daniels Distillery, No. 86 L 19211 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed September 2, 1986)).
102. Note, A Spirited Call, supra note 54, at 1629 n.142 (quoting Plaintiff's Complaint
at 17, Hoover v. Jack Daniels Distillery, No. 86 L 19211 (111. Cir. Ct. filed September 2,
1986)); see also Middleton, supra note 100, at 12.
103. See Hoover, No. 87 C 5509, at *2. Illinois previously adopted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See supra note 96; see also supra note 74 (listing those
jurisdictions which have adopted § 402A of the Restatement).
104. Hoover, No. 87 C 5509, at *1-2. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id. at *1.
105. See id. at *1-2.
106. Id. at *2.
107. Although not directly relevant to the health hazards associated with consuming
alcohol, a third type of suit brought against alcohol manufacturers is worthy of brief mention.
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ing that alcohol manufacturers breached their duty to the consuming
public by failing to warn that excessive consumption of their product
may potentially cause acute alcohol poisoning.108 In Pemberton v.
American Distilled Spirits Co.,10 9 a father instituted a strict products liability action against a grain alcohol manufacturer, seeking to
recover damages for the death of his minor son who died as a result
of the over-consumption of alcohol." 0 The father alleged that the
defendant's product approached pure alcohol, and as such, was unfit
for human consumption."' The plaintiff claimed that the manufacThese are cases in which a person is injured as a result of the negligent operation of an automobile by an intoxicated driver. Injured plaintiffs have brought suits against the alcohol manufacturers for failure to warn that their product should not be consumed prior to driving an
automobile, or alternatively, to warn of the amount of alcohol which can be consumed safely
before legal intoxication results. Courts faced with these claims have unanimously held in
favor of the manufacturers. See, e.g., Maguire v. Pabst Brewing Co., 387 N.W.2d 565, 570
(Iowa 1986) (answering certified questions for the federal district court and stating that "although persons engaging in consumption of alcoholic beverages may not be able to ascertain
precisely when the concentration of alcohol in their blood, breath, or urine reaches the proscribed level, they should, in the exercise of reasonable intelligence, understand what type of
conduct places them in jeopardy of violating the [law]." (quoting State v. Bock, 357 N.W.2d
29, 34 (Iowa 1984))); Russell v. Bishop, No. 88 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming summary
judgment for manufacturer and quoting at length from Pemberton v. American Distilled Spirits Co., 664 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn. 1984)); Malek v. Miller Brewing Co., 749 S.W.2d 521, 522
(Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming summary judgment for manufacturer and recognizing that
alcoholic beverages are specifically excluded as a product which is not unreasonably dangerous
in the comments to the Restatement); Morris v. Adolph Coors Co., 735 S.W.2d 578, 582-83
(Tex. Ct, App. 1987) (concluding that plaintiffs' strict liability theory failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted since the ordinary consumer knows that over-consumption
may impair those motor skills necessary to drive an automobile). These courts have concluded
that the premise that alcohol consumption will lead to intoxication, and intoxicated persons
should not operate motor vehicles, is already a matter of common knowledge. See Maguire,
387 N.W.2d at 570; Malek, 749 S.W.2d at 523; Morris, 735 S.W.2d at 583-84. In response to
plaintiffs' arguments that the specific amount of alcohol which can be consumed over a given
period of time before legal intoxication results is not a matter of common knowledge, the
courts have concluded that that degree of knowledge is not necessary for ordinary consumers,
nor feasible to disseminate. See Maguire, 387 N.W.2d at 570; Malek, 749 S.W.2d at 523.
108. Acute alcohol poisoning is an abnormal condition, taking place within hours of ingestion "resulting from an extreme state of alcohol intoxication, from which it differs only in
degree." See R. O'BRIEN & M. CHAFETZ, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ALCOHOLISM 18 (1982); see
also R. SLOANE, THE SLOANE-DORLAND

ANNOTATED

MEDICAL-LEGAL DICTIONARY

10

(1987) (defining "acute" by citation to Woodall Indus., Inc. v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 483 F.2d 986, 1000 (6th Cir. 1973)). In general, blood alcohol concentrations above 0.4%
result in the occurrence of alcohol poisoning. R. O'BRIEN & M. CHAFETz, supra, at 18; see
also J. WYNGAARDEN & L. SMITH, 1 CECIL TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 48-49 (18th ed. 1988)
(noting that blood alcohol levels exceeding 500 mg per deciliter may result in death for sporadic drinkers).
109. 664 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn. 1984).
110. Id. at 691.
111. Id. at 692.
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turer knew, or should have known, that over-consumption of its product could be lethal, and that absent a proper warning, the product
was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous.' l
As in Garrison,the Pemberton court relied upon comment j of
the Restatement in concluding that a manufacturer has no duty to
warn of dangers inherent in the use of its product which are commonly known and recognized." 3 In concluding that the plaintiff's
complaint did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted,
the court took judicial notice of the dangers associated with consuming alcohol." 4 Specifically, the court stated that "[a]lcohol has been
present and used in society during all recorded history and its characteristics and qualities have been fully explored and developed and
are a part of the body of common knowledge."" ' 5 With regard to
certain risks posed by a product, the court held that the manufacturer is entitled to rely upon the "common sense and good judgment" of the consumer." 6 The court therefore held that "death or
conserious injuries resulting from either excessive or prolonged
117
risk.
of
category
this
within
fall
sumption of alcohol"
The Ohio Court of Appeals, in Desatnik v. Lem Motlow Prop.,
Inc.,"" reached a result similar to the holding in Pemberton. In
Desatnik, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against the
manufacturer/distributor of Jack Daniel's Whiskey." 9 The plaintiff
alleged that the manufacturer had a duty to warn unsuspecting users
that over-consumption could be fatal. 120 In granting summary judg112.

Id. Although the plaintiff alleged causes of action under strict liability, negligence

and breach of warranty theories, id. at 691, the issue before the court was whether whether
the complaint stated a claim under the Tennessee Products Liability Act, id.; see also TENN.
CODE. ANN. §§ 29-28-101 to 108 (1980 & Supp. 1989).
113. Pemberton, 664 S.W.2d at 692. Note that although the deceased was a minor,

whether a product is in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" depends upon the
knowledge of the ordinary consumer of the product. Id; see RESTATEMEN-r (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A comment i (1965). Moreover, "where the danger is evident to most users of a product,
there is no duty to warn an occasional, inexperienced user." Pemberton, 664 S.W.2d at 693.
.114.

Pemberton, 664 S.W.2d at 693-94.

115.

Id. at 693. As an example, the court noted that "[c]ourts, legislatures, parents,

ministers, and temperance organizations and others have long recognized and decried the dan-

gers inherent in alcohol." Id.; cf. supra note 1 (discussing the various functions performed by
alcohol over the course of history).
116. Pemberton, 664 S.W.2d at 693.
117. Id.
118. No. 84 C.A. 104 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
119. Id. at *2.
120. Id. at *3.The plaintiff advanced the following three theories of liability: (1) strict

liability, (2) negligence and (3) implied warranty. Id. at *2-3. The court noted that Ohio
adopted § 402A of the Restatement. Id. at *5 (citing Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio
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ment for the manufacturer, the court held that a manufacturer could
not be held strictly liable for failing to warn of dangers commonly
known by the ordinary consumer of his product.12 ' Despite the plaintiff's assertion that Restatement comments i and j did not specifically
refer to the danger of death by a single overdose of alcohol as being
commonly known, 22 the court concluded that the drafters of the Restatement used alcohol as an example of a product whose dangers
are generally known and recognized. 1 2s As a result, the court con-

cluded that alcohol manufacturers are excluded from strict liability
24
under the Restatement.

St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977)). In Desatnik, court held that under Ohio law the theories
of strict liability and implied warranty are virtually indistinguishable, and as a result the concept of implied warranty is included within the scope of strict products liability. No. 84 C.A.
104, slip op. at *4-5.
121. Desatnik, No. 85 C.A. 104, slip op. at *11. Although the plaintiff claimed that the
decedent had no knowledge of the possible toxic or fatal effects of over-consumption of the
manufacturer's whiskey, the court nevertheless held that a manufacturer has no duty to warn
of open and obvious dangers associated with alcohol. Id. The court stated that "[t]he test to
determine whether a danger is obvious is an objective standard, not dependent upon actual
knowledge. Such knowledge and the realization of the danger are imputed where an awareness
is possessed by the ordinary consumer who purchases or uses the product." Id.
122. Id. at *5-*8.
123. Id. at *9.
124. See id. Beginning its analysis with comment i, the court stated that it "does not
misunderstand the clear meaning of the phrase 'Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous
. . . but bad whiskey. . . is unreasonably dangerous.[']" Id. at *7. Since the plaintiff did not
allege that the manufacturer's whiskey was defective because it was produced in such a way as
to render it toxic (i.e. "containing a dangerous amount of fusel oil") and, therefore, unreasonably dangerous, the court concluded that no claim existed under comment i. Id. at *7-8; see
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965).
Thus, by applying the court's analysis above, merely alleging that excessive consumption
of whiskey can be fatal is not sufficient for recovery under comment i, since this is a matter of
common knowledge. To successfully state a claim upder comment i, the plaintiff must, therefore, allege that the particular defendant's whiskey is bad whiskey, containing more toxicants
than are found in ordinary whiskey. See Desatnik, No. 84 C.A. 104, slip op. at *7-8. The
danger presented by these additional toxicants is not one which is likely to be perceived by an
ordinary consumer without the presence of a warning and, therefore, the potentiality of danger
would not be commonly known. See id.
The court then examined whether the plaintiff could successfully bring a claim under
comment j. See id. at *8-9. Comment j requires manufacturers and sellers to warn consumers
of those dangers inherent in the use of their products which are not commonly known. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965), see also supra note 78 (setting
forth comment j). The plaintiff alleged that the risk of over-consumption of alcohol leading to
toxic and fatal results was a danger not generally known and recognized. Desatnik, No. 84
C.A. 104, slip op. at *9. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim under comment j when it
stated the following:
Clearly, the authors of the Restatement [(Second)] used alcohol as an example of a
product which is only potentially dangerous when consumed over a long period of
time or in excessive quantity and the dangers of which are generally known and
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C. Analysis of Recent Case Law Holding Alcohol Manufacturers
May Have a Duty to Warn

1. Extended Use Cases.- The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, in Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co.,12 5 was the first court to allow
a strict products liability claim against an alcohol manufacturer to
reach the jury. 2 ' The court, determining that triable issues of fact
existed, was unable to conclude, as a matter of law, that the dangers
associated with the consumption of alcoholic beverages were commonly known. 27 In Hon, the plaintiff sought recovery for the death
of her husband who died of pancreatitis resulting from consuming
beer manufactured by the defendant over at least a six year period."28 Conceding that it is common knowledge that long-term con1 29
sumption of alcohol can be addictive and lead to physical injury,
the plaintiff claimed that Stroh had a duty to warn of lesser known
dangers; specifically, that moderate consumption, even though prolonged, can result in certain types of physical injuries not likely to be
anticipated by the consumer. 30
recognized. [Plaintiff] can infer no duty to warn from comment j.

Id.
In addition to concluding that the authors of the Restatement regarded the dangers associated with alcohol consumption as a matter of common knowledge, the court itself came to a
similar conclusion. Id. at *11-12. The court relied upon Garrison v. Heublein, Inc., 673 F.2d
189 (7th Cir. 1982), and stated "that in light of [the] common knowledge concerning alcohol
and its effects, 'the defendant (manufacturer) had no duty to add, by labels or advertising, to
the flow of information.'" Id. at *11 (quoting Garrison, 673 F.2d at 190).
125. 835 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1987).
126. See Comment, Alcohol Manufacturers and the Duty to Warn: An Analysis of Recent Case Law in Light of the Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of 1988, 38 EMORY L.J. 1191,
1202 (1989) (authored by Carter H. Dukes); Note, A Case For Alcohol Beverage Warning
Labels: Duty to Warn of Dangers of Consumption, 53 Mo. L. REv. 555 (1988) (authored by
Stacy M. Andreas).
127. Hon, 835 F.2d at 516-17.
128. Id. at 511. Specifically, the decedent consumed two to three cans of beer per evening, approximately four nights per week, for a period of at least six years. Id.
Although not directly relevant to the issue of summary judgment, it is important to note
that the decedent's consumption consisted "mainly" of beer manufactured by Stroh. Id. At the
trial on the merits, the defendant's consumption of many varieties and brands of alcoholic
beverages could complicate the determination of the extent of an individual manufacturer's
liability.
129. Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 665 F. Supp. 1140, 1142 n.3 (M.D. Pa.), vacated, 835
F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting at length from plaintiff's brief submitted in opposition to
Stroh's motion for summary judgment).
130. In her brief submitted in opposition to Stroh's motion for summary judgment, the
plaintiff introduced testimony of a doctor of toxicology and pharmacology. Hon, 835 F.2d at
511. The court summarized the doctor's opinions as follows:
(1) the understanding shared by members of the public is that excessive and pro-
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The court applied Pennsylvania law 31 and summarily dismissed
the plaintiff's contention that the public is not generally aware that
extended consumption of alcohol could result in pancreatitis.132
Rather, the court focused its attention on the issue of whether the
ordinary consumer is aware that moderate consumption of alcohol
over an extended period of time could lead to serious bodily injury.133 Basing its decision solely on the affidavit of the plaintiff's
expert witnessS and Stroh's commercial advertising, 35 the court
longed use of alcoholic beverages is likely to result in disease, principally of the
liver; (2) [decedent's] case was not within the risk thus appreciated by the public
both because (a) his use was prolonged but not excessive and (b) his disease was of
the pancreas; and (3) the public's understanding is "archaic" because medical science has now established that either excessive or prolonged, even though moderate,
use of alcohol may result in diseases of many kinds, including pancreatic disease.
Id. (emphasis in original). Since Stroh did not challenge the doctor's expertise, the court assumed he was qualified to testify on all matters contained in his affidavit. Id. at 511 n.l.
131. Since the court based its jurisdiction on diversity grounds, the court was required to
apply the law of the state in which it sat. See id. at 512; see also Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938). Pennsylvania has adopted § 402A of the Restatement. See Webb v. Zern, 422
Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966); see also supra note 74 (setting forth jurisdictions which have
adopted § 402A). In applying the Restatement, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held
that the trial judge must first decide, as a threshold issue and matter of law, whether the
defendant's product could be considered "unreasonably dangerous." Hon, 835 F.2d at 512
(applying the rule as stated in Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020
(1978)). A plaintiff asserting a strict products liability claim under Pennsylvania law need only
establish that the product was defective when it left the defendant's (manufacturer's) possession, and that the defect was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Id. This burden is
met by proving that given the common knowledge of the community as to the dangers associated with consuming alcoholic beverages, a warning is necessary in order to render the product
safe for its intended use (i.e. consumption). See id. at 514 (applying the second half of the test
established in Azzarello).
132. Hon, 835 F.2d at 516 n.8 (stating that "[i]t is not necessary that consumers be
aware of each type, of malady to which prolonged consumption of alcohol makes them susceptible, nor is it necessary for them to know every organ which is endangered."). If the plaintiff
knows, or should know, that his consumption "creates a substantial risk of bodily injury" this
is sufficient knowledge to negate the manufacturer's duty to warn. Id. It is of no consequence
that the ordinary consumer is not aware that prolonged consumption of alcohol can cause
pancreatitis, if he is aware that the same consumption can lead to cirrhosis of the liver. See id.
133. See id. at 515-17. Under Pennsylvania law, the determination of this issue is for
the jury, unless the record reveals "no factual basis" for finding for the plaintiff. Id. at 514.
But cf. Pemberton, 664 S.W.2d at 692 (Tenn. 1984) (concluding that under Tennessee law,
where the facts are undisputed, the issue of whether the manufacturer has a duty to warn is to
be determined as a matter of law); see also supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text (discussing Pemberton).
134. See supra note 130 (stating the court's summary of the doctor's testimony as it
appeared in his affidavit).
135. The court determined that the jury could find that Stroh's commercials impressed
upon the alcohol consuming public the notion that consuming eight to twelve cans of beer per
week is "part of the 'good life' and is properly associated with healthy, robust activities ......
Hon, 835 F.2d at 514-15.
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concluded that a trier of fact could find that the ordinary consumer
is not aware that the amount of alcohol consumed by the decedent
was potentially fatal.331 The court held that where the ordinary consumer does not appreciate the health hazards associated with consuming alcohol, the manufacturer has a duty to warn of those dangers, and failure to do so could result in the manufacturer being held
strictly liable to injured consumers.137

In order to allow the question of common knowledge to go to
the jury, the court distinguished the positions adopted by both the
comments to the Restatement and prior case law. Comment j of the
Restatement cites alcohol as an example of a product whose dangers,
resulting from prolonged consumption, are commonly known and
recognized.1 38 Arguably, the Restatement's presumption is over-in-

clusive.130 In fact, the Hon court was unwilling to give the Restatement authors' reference to consumer knowledge such a broad interpretation. 4 ° The court noted that comment j does not suggest that
consuming alcohol "for any extended period, no matter how short, in
any quantity, no matter how small, presents generally known dangers."' 41 As such, the court interpreted comment j as stating that
136.

Id. at 514.

137. Id. at 515; see also RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comments h, i & j
(1965); supra notes 70-91 and accompanying text (discussing inadequate warnings as a basis
for strict liability under the Restatement).
138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965); supra note 78

(setting forth comment j); sources cited supra note 91 (recognizing the Restatement authors'
assumption that the dangers associated with the excessive, or prolonged, consumption of alcohol are commonly known).
139. See Britt, supra note 38, at 252-53 (arguing that courts must look beyond the
common knowledge presumption in the Restatement since the dangers arising from the interaction of drugs and alcohol, and the dangers associated with drinking during pregnancy are
not commonly known); Note, A Spirited Call, supra note 54, at 1620-21 (indicating that
recent scientific findings undercut the examples relied upon in the comments to the Restatement); Note, Mitigating Alcohol Health Hazards, supra note 48, at 985-86 (stating that the
Restatement's presumption of consumer knowledge must be modified to reflect recent scientific
developments).
140. See Hon, 835 F.2d at 515.
141. Id. The court adopts a similarly narrow interpretation for the authors' reference to
the dangers associated with alcoholic beverages in comment i. Comment i cites "good whiskey" as an example of a product which is not unreasonably dangerous since it is not dangerous
to an extent beyond that contemplated by the ordinary consumer. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965); sources cited supra note 89 (recognizing authors'
reference to alcoholic beverages as products which are not unreasonably dangerous); supra
note 81 (setting forth comment i). The Hon court, however, was unwilling to read the comment so broadly. Instead, the court noted that alcohol manufacturers are excepted from liability only because the dangers of intoxication and alcoholism are already appreciated by the
ordinary consumer. Hon, 835 F.2d at 515-16 n.6.
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"when the danger is generally known, no warning is required," and
that alcohol is merely cited as an example of a product falling within
42
this rule.'
In finding that a triable issue of fact existed, the court also distinguished all of the previous cases which held, as a matter of law,
that the dangers associated with alcohol consumption were com142. Id. at 515 (emphasis in original). The court's interpretation of comment j faces
many obstacles. First, the court's reading renders the latter portion of comment j meaningless.
Comment j exempts manufacturers from a duty to warn when: (1) their product is only dangerous when consumed excessively; (2) the danger arises only after prolonged consumption;
and (3) when the danger or potential danger is commonly known. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A comment j (1965). This portion of comment j is very straightforward and,
therefore, examples are not necessary to clarify its meaning. By stating that the comment's
reference to alcohol was merely an example of a product falling within this rule, the court
brought forth an unprecedented interpretation of the comment. Thousands of products exist
which are potentially dangerous when consumed excessively; or over a prolonged period of
time. See Wade, supra note 16, at 846 (noting that nearly all food and drugs are dangerous
when consumed excessively). No rational purpose could have been served by the authors of the
Restatement using a single product as an example to clarify an unambiguous statute, where
thousands of such products potentially exist. If the existence of the authors' reference to the
dangers associated with alcoholic beverages is to be given any rational purpose, it can only be
as an example of a product whose dangers, given excessive or prolonged consumption, are
generally known and recognized. See Desatnik v. Lem Motlow Prop., Inc., No. 84 C.A. 104,
slip op. at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file); Malek v. Miller
Brewing Co., 749 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); Britt, supra note 38, at 252; Note, A
Spirited Call, supra note 54, at 1621; Note, supra note 69, at 66-67; Note, Mitigating Alcohol Health Hazards, supra note 48, at 984 n.34.
The court's misinterpretation is further apparent upon a careful examination of the way
in which alcohol is referred to in comment j. The comment states: "again the dangers of alcoholic beverages are an example." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A comment j
(1965) (emphasis added). The word "again" refers to the use of alcohol as an example in
comment i. Comment i cites "good whiskey" as an example of a product which is not unreasonably dangerous, since it is not "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A comment i
(1965); sources cited supra note 89 (recognizing the authors' reference to alcoholic beverages
as products which are not unreasonably dangerous).
In view of this introductory language, the same treatment accorded the dangers associated
with consuming alcoholic beverages in comment i should be used in determining the purpose
for citing alcohol as an example in comment j. Since alcohol is used in comment i as an
example of a product whose dangers are commonly known, it is likely that the authors intended the same treatment to be accorded the use of alcohol as an example in comment j.
Instead of twisting the authors' reference to the dangers associated with alcohol so as to effectuate the ends which the court sought, the court could have concluded that it was not bound by
the authors' opinions on common knowledge, which were formulated over two decades ago. See
Britt, supra note 38, at 252-53; Note, A Spirited Call, supra note 54, at 1620-21; Note,
Mitigating Alcohol Health Hazards, supra note 48, at 985-86. The latter approach is more
efficient and less obtrusive than the reconstruction undertaken by the court. The court's action,
however, can be rationalized by interpreting the Restatement's common knowledge presumption as precluding alcohol manufacturers from strict liability thereunder. See supra notes 12224 and accompanying text (discussing preclusion).
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monly known.14 3 The court found that each of those cases presented
records from which a trier of fact could only conclude that an ordinary consumer should have been aware that his consumption created
a substantial risk of injury," thereby alleviating those manufacturers from a duty to warn as a matter of law.
In distinguishing these cases, the court also distinguished Garrison v. Heublein, Inc.145 The court differentiated Garrisondespite the
fact that both cases dealt with plaintiffs who had suffered injuries 146
as
a result of consuming alcohol over an extended period of time.
The court read into comment j the requirement that the plaintiff's
consumption must have been excessive, in addition to prolonged, for
the defendant to be relieved of liability.147 Specifically, the court
concluded that alcohol manufacturers are not precluded from liability for a consumer's prolonged consumption under comment j, absent
a determination that the quantity of plaintiffs consumption was sufficiently large, and the period sufficiently long, to present dangers
which are within the contemplation of the ordinary consumer . 48
Looking to the plaintiff's alleged injuries in Garrison,41 the court
concluded that except for physical damage caused to the consumer,
all of the allegations involved the excessive use of alcohol. 50 The
court therefore found that despite the fact that there was no mention
of the plaintiffs excessive consumption in the Garrisoncourt's opinion, one could reasonably infer that the plaintiffs consumption, in
143.
144.

See cases cited supra note 15.
Hon, 835 F.2d at 516-17.

145.

673 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1982); see supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text (dis-

cussing Garrison).
Note that although another extended use case was decided three months prior to Hon,
Hoover v. Jack Daniels Distillery, No. 87 C 5509 (N.D. I11.
Sept. 14, 1987), it is not referred
to in the latter decision.

146. ' In Garrison,the plaintiff consumed vodka that was manufactured by the defendant
over a twenty year period. 673 F.2d at 189. The issue of whether twenty years constituted "a

long period of time" within the meaning of comment j was never specifically addressed by the
court in its decision. However, it is fair to assume that the court took judicial notice of the fact
that twenty years constituted an extended period. See id. at 191.
Although the plaintiff in Hon consumed Stroh's beer for at least six years, the court

accepted the plaintiff's expert witness' opinion that such a time period was "prolonged." 835
F.2d at 511 n.2; see supra note 130 (discussing and quoting the court's summary of the expert's testimony as contained in his affidavit).
147. Hon, 835 F.2d at 516.
148. Id. -

149. See supra note 95 (listing the injuries alleged to have resulted from the plaintiff's
consumption of alcohol in Garrison).

150. Hon, 835 F.2d at 516 n.7.
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addition to being prolonged, was also excessive.1 51
Although the Restatement 52 and prior case law 53 have consistently held that the dangers associated with the prolonged consumption of alcohol are commonly known, the Hon court's conclusion that
some degree of excessiveness must accompany prolonged use appears
logical.1 54 Applying the Hon court's analysis, a manufacturer has a
duty to warn unsuspecting consumers of the minimum quantity of
alcohol 55 which, if consumed over a prolonged period, creates a sub56
stantial risk of bodily injury.
While the court's conclusion is theoretically sound, in reality it
is impractical. Requiring the design of effective warnings imposes an
impractical burden on alcohol manufacturers.1 57 This burden stems
151. Id. Interestingly, the same test that the Hon court used to determine that the plaintiff's consumption in Garrisonwas excessive, can be used to infer that the decedent's consumption in Hon was excessive. One can conclude that consuming two to three cans of beer per
evening, approximately four nights per week is excessive, if the test for excessiveness is, as the
Garrisoncourt stated:
to cause physical damage to the consumer; to cause impairment to physical and
motor skills for a period of time after consumption; to cause impairment to mental
capacity and facilities for a period of time after consumption; to affect the personality of the consumer; to be addictive; and to create dangers in the operation of a
motor vehicle.
673 F.2d at 189 n.2. Moreover, in Garrison,the plaintiff's consumption of vodka over a twenty
year period merely resulted in physical injury, while in Hon, the plaintiff's consumption of beer
over a six year period resulted in death. This is yet another basis for concluding that the
decedent's consumption in Hon was excessive, in addition to being prolonged.
152. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965), set forth supra
note 78; sources' cited supra note 91.
153. See supra notes 92-124 and accompanying text.
154. Clearly, if a case arose where the plaintiff's consumption of one glass of beer per
week over a prolonged period was proven to have resulted in bodily injury, this would be an
example of an instance where a trier of fact could reasonably cqnclude that the danger would
not have been contemplated by the ordinary consumer. Cf. Hon, 835 F.2d at 511 (summarizing a toxicologist's affidavit which states that the understanding of the general public is that
excessive and prolonged consumption is likely to result in serious bodily injury).
155. See Han, 835 F.2d at 514. The court concluded that the trier of fact could properly
find that the quantity and manner of plaintiff's consumption-specifically two to three cans of
beer per evening, approximately four evenings per week, for six years--was potentially fatal,
and that this fact was neither known to him nor to the consuming public. Id.
156. It is important to note that the Hon court, when presented with the specific facts of
that case, did not consider the potential risk of a particular bodily injury as a variable in
determining an alcohol manufacturer's duty to warn. See id. at 516 n.8; see supra note 132
and accompanying text (discussing the court's holding). If alcohol manufacturers were required to consider this variable, the job of devising adequate warnings would become vastly
more complicated. See infra notes 190-92 and accompanying text (discussing the need to warn
of potential health hazards).
157. Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 665 F. Supp. 1140, 1146 (M.D. Pa.), vacated, 835 F.2d
510 (3rd Cir. 1987). Although the Third Circuit vacated the district court's opinion, the appel-
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from the notion that a general warning of the risk of moderate consumption is inappropriate 158 since that amount of consumption has
not been scientifically proven to be harmful to most consumers.15 9 To
the contrary, some medical studies have determined that alcohol
may actually be beneficial to one's health when moderately consumed. 160 Under such circumstances, requiring manufacturers to
provide blanket warnings of the risk of moderate consumption not
only promotes the dissemination of potentially inaccurate and misleading information, but also unduly burdens manufacturers.
How an individual's body will react to the presence of alcohol,
i.e., positively or negatively, is dependent upon a number of subjective factors, such as nutrition. 6 ' While small quantities of alcohol
consumed over relatively brief periods can potentially be lethal for
some consumers,16 2 similar consumption may, in fact, enhance other
consumers' health. 63 In order for manufacturers to provide effective
warnings, the warnings must incorporate these subjective factors
since, as previously demonstrated, a general warning may be inappropriate. An effective warning, therefore, must disclose those factors which-make an individual particularly susceptible to bodily inlate court expressly left open the issue of the feasibility of devising an effective warning for a
more complete development of the record on remand. 835 F.2d at 514.
158. See Hon, 835 F.2d at 514 (noting Stroh's contention); cf. ALCOHOL REPORT, supra
note 38, at 41 (concluding that the risks associated with alcoholic beverages may not be effectively communicated through a label since, unlike cigarettes, moderate consumption is not
necessarily hazardous, and therefore, a general warning such as "Alcohol may be hazardous to
your health" may not be convincing to the general public).
159. ALCOHOL REPORT, supra note 38, at 41; see'Wilber, Is All Alcohol Equal? The
Chemists Say Yes, but the Answer May Be More Complicated, 94 SC. DIGEST 17 (May
1986); Sanders, supra note 2, at C2, col. 3.
160. See generally ALCOHOL REPORT, supra note 38, at i (noting that moderate alcohol
consumption has been related to "increased positive feeling states," a reduction in stress and
tension, and lower incidence of coronary heart disease); Wilber, supra note 159, at 17 (citing a
recent study conducted by the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine for the Alcoholic Beverage
Medical Research Foundation in which it was found that moderate beer consumers appeared
healthier than non-consumers, and were 13 % less likely to report illness); Sanders, supra note
2, at C2, col. 5 (noting a recent American Journal of Public Health report which states that
women who drink moderately are approximately 33 % less likely to be hospitalized than those
who have never had a drink, and although the result for men is similar, the percentage is
slightly lower at 25%).
161. Hon, 665 F. Supp. at 1146 (quoting plaintiff's expert in toxicology and pharmacology).
162. See id. (quoting plaintiff's expert); see, e.g., supra note 107 (discussing acute alcohol poisoning); supra text accompanying notes 109-11, 119-22, 169-72 (discussing acute alcohol cases and describing various amounts of consumption which led to plaintiffs' deaths).
163. See supra note 160 (discussing the positive effects associated with the moderate
consumption of alcohol).
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jury when consuming moderate amounts of alcohol. Such an
approach essentially results in requiring manufacturers to devise
warnings suitable for the particular tolerance of individual consum1 64
ers-an impractical burden.
Assuming arguendo, that manufacturers are able to devise
warnings which take into consideration all subjective factors which
make one susceptible to bodily injury, thereby eliminating individual
characteristics as an issue subject to litigation, a second issue arises
regarding the threshold level of consumption necessary to cause
physical injury. The term "moderate consumption" is arguably too
vague to provide adequate information to alcohol consumers and
thereby invites attack by potential plaintiffs.1 65 Devising a more specific warning, however, is not plausible since the level of alcohol consumption which may result in serious bodily injury varies depending
upon the length of the "prolonged period." Additionally, various consumption patterns such as binge drinking, and their unknown effects
on the level of consumption necessary to produce serious bodily injury 6 ' further complicate a manufacturer's ability to provide adequate warnings to individuals.
2. Acute Alcohol Poisoning.- As in Hon, the Texas Court of
Appeals in Brune v. Brown Forman Corp.,"'7 also permitted the
question of the scope of common knowledge to go to the jury. 68 In
Brune, the plaintiff sought recovery for her daughter's death, which
was caused by acute alcohol poisoning.16 9 The decedent, a college
student, purchased tequila manufactured and bottled by the defendant, and began consuming straight "shots" until death resulted. 1 0
The plaintiff alleged that Brown Forman was strictly liable for failing to warn that excessive consumption of their product could be
171
fatal.
164. Hon, 665 F. Supp. at 1146; accord Maguire v. Pabst Brewing Co., 387 N.W.2d
565, 570 (Iowa 1986) (noting the impracticality of requiring manufacturers to devise warnings
suitable for the tolerance level of each consumer).
165. See supra note 155 (demonstrating the Third Circuit's willingness to look to the
plaintiff's actual consumption when determining whether a triable issue of fact exists).
166. Cf. ALCOHOL REPORT, supra note 38, at 7 (noting that the question still remains
with respect to "inter-individual" and "different patterns of consumption").
167. 758 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
168. Id. at 831.
169. Id. at 827-28.

170.

Id.at 828.

171. Id.The plaintiff's original complaint also sought recovery against the distributor
and retailer of defendant's tequila. Id. at 827-28. However, the plaintiff only appealed from
that portion of the court's order granting summary judgment for the manufacturer, Brown
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In concluding that the question of common knowledge posed a
triable issue of fact, the court's analysis relied upon weak authority.
The court first noted that the decedent had had little exposure to the
use of alcohol and as a result, was unfamiliar with the dangers associated with excessive use. 17 2 This fact was of little importance, however, since the appropriate standard for measuring common knowledge was the knowledge possessed by the ordinary consumer of the
product, with the knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics. 17 s The decedent's naivete should not have been dispositive in determining the knowledge common to the general public 17 4 and as a result, does not provide support for the conclusion that
the dangers associated with consuming alcohol are not commonly
known and recognized.
Second, the court cited the facts that Congress had been considering warning legislation and that Mexico had already instituted
such legislation as authority for the proposition that the dangers resulting from consuming alcohol may not be generally known. 17 The
possibility of future Congressional regulation, however, does not
translate into a reason for concluding that the dangers are not commonly known.17 6 Congress' intent behind enacting warning legislation may be to "remind" the general public of the health hazards
associated with consuming alcohol, rather than to instruct them of
those hazards.1 7 7 In addition, the court's reference to Mexico's warnForman. Id.
It should also be noted that Texas had previously adopted § 402A of the Restatement. See
McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. 1967); Shamrock Fuel & Oil
Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. 1967).
172. Brune, 758 S.W.2d at 830.
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965); supra note 81 (set-

ting forth comment i); see supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text (discussing unreasonably
dangerous criteria).

174. See, e.g., Desatnik v. Lem Motlow Prop., Inc., No. 84 C.A. 104, slip op. at *11
(Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file); Pemberton v. American Distilled Spirits Co., 664 S.W.2d 690, 692-93 (Tenn. 1984).
175. Brune, 758 S.W.2d at 830.
176. See Hoover v. Jack Daniels Distillery, No. 87 C 5509, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14,

1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). In Hoover, the court concluded that a current interest in federal alcohol warning legislation provided no basis for questioning the long recognized
premise that the dangers are commonly known, since the legislation had not been passed. Id.
Furthermore, the court recognized that such legislation, if passed, would probably preempt any

future state products liability suits. Id.
177.

For a brief discussion of Congress' intent to "remind" the general public of the

dangers related to consuming alcohol in passing the Alcoholic Beverage Liability Act of 1988,
see supra text accompanying note 43; see Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-690, § 213(1), 102 Stat. 4518 (codified at 27 U.S.C.A. § 213(1) (West Supp. 1989).
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ing legislation provides no support for its argument, as the knowledge possessed by Mexican consumers is not indicative of the knowledge possessed by the ordinary consumer in the United States. 178
In addition, by permitting the plaintiff to present his case to the
jury, the court abandoned the positions adopted by both the Restatement and prior case law. In both Pemberton v. American Distilled
Spirits Co.' 79 and Desatnik v. Lem Motlow, Prop., Inc., 80° the courts
concluded, as a matter of law, that the general public was aware of
the potential for excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages to lead
to death. 18 ' Although both Pemberton and Desatnik were decided
the
several years prior to Brune, the Brune court refers only to
82
Pemberton decision, without ever attempting to distinguish it.'
Instead, the Brune court based its decision upon an overly narrow reading of comments h, i and j of the Restatement. The court
concluded that alcohol manufacturers may have a duty to warn users
of the potential dangers associated with over-consuming their products under comment h, and that neither comment i nor comment j
precludes liability.1 83 Despite the clear use of "good whiskey" as an
example of a product which is not unreasonably dangerous in comment i,'84 the court concluded that alcohol manufacturers are only
precluded from liability under the comment because the dangers of
intoxication and alcoholism are commonly known.' 8 5 Applying a similarly narrow reading to comment j, the court concluded that alcohol
was merely cited as an example of a product for which a manufac178.

The court also referred to the existence of health warning labels on "Everclear"

grain alcohol as further support for concluding that the dangers of consuming alcohol may not
be commonly known. Brune, 758 S.W.2d at 830. Although the manufacturer of Everelear may
have voluntarily placed a warning on the product because it felt the general public was uninformed of the dangers inherent in its consumption, a more realistic motivation may have been
to avoid future litigation.
179. 664 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn. 1984).
180.

No. 84 C.A. 104, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1986) (LEXIS, States library,

Ohio file).
181.

Desatnik, No. 84 C.A. 104, slip op. at *11; Pemberton, 664 S.W.2d at 693; see

supra notes 109-24 and accompanying text (discussing Desatnik and Pemberton); cf. Hon v.
Stroh Brewery Co., 835 F.2d 510, 516-17 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating that acute alcohol poisoning
did not raise a triable issue of fact since a jury could only conclude that the risk of a single
overdose of alcohol leading to death is commonly known).

182. See Brune, 758 S.W.2d at 828.
183. See id. at 829-30.
184.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965); supra note 81 (set-

ting forth comment i); see authority cited supra note 89 (recognizing the Restatement authors'
reference to alcohol as a product which is not unreasonably dangerous).
185. Brune, 758 S.W.2d at 829.
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turer has no duty to warn when the dangers are already appreciated
by the ordinary consumer. 186 Although comment j cites alcohol as an
example of a product whose dangers resulting from excessive use are
generally known,'18 7 the court noted that the comment does not say
that "the dangers of acute ethyl ingestion resulting in death" are
88
necessarily commonly known.'
Based upon the plaintiff's weak evidence and the court's overly
narrow interpretation of the Restatement's references to alcohol, the
court concluded that the determination of whether the dangers of
acute ingestion resulting in death are commonly known is a question
of fact for the jury to determine. 8 9
After Hon, the difficulty manufacturers would face in devising
adequate warnings'9 " would be compounded if the Brune reasoning
and holding was applied in future alcohol warning cases. While the
Hon court was concerned with the general public's knowledge as to
the amount of consumption that may lead to a "substantial risk of
bodily injury,"'' the Brune court questions the public's knowledge
as to the type of injury that may result from certain levels of consumption. Given the vast array of potential health hazards associated
with consuming alcohol, 192 and the uncertainty as to which particular dangers are generally appreciated by the ordinary consumer, alcohol manufacturers would have to provide a warning booklet with
each bottle of alcohol sold in order to adequately protect themselves
from liability.

IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Courts faced with future failure to warn claims will be forced to
determine the issue of whether Congress intended to preempt judicial action in this area. Even though Congress' intent regarding preemption is not explicit, a careful examination of the policies underly186. Id.
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965); supra note 78; see
sources cited supra note 90 (recognizing the Restatement authors' reference to alcohol as a
product which is not defective).
188. 758 S.W.2d at 829-30.
189. Id.
190. See supra notes 152-66 and accompanying text (describing the burdensome difficulties manufacturers would face if they were forced to devise warnings).
191. Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 835 F.2d 510, 516 n.8 (3d Cir. 1987); see supra note
132 (discussing the relevant portions of the Hon decision).
192. See, e.g., ALCOHOL REPORT, supra note 38, at 1-28 (providing a 28 page summary
of many of the health hazards, scientifically proven as of 1980, associated with the consumption of alcohol).
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ing the federal alcohol warning legislation leads to the conclusion
that Congress intended to preempt such claims.193 However, even if
courts conclude that Congress intended to preempt judicial action in
this area, courts are still likely to continue entertaining extended use
cases which claim injuries resulting from consumption dating prior
to the effective date of the federal alcohol warning legislation. 94 If
courts decide entertain future inadequate warning label cases because they believe these claims are not preempted, or because such
claims arose prior to the effective date of the federal alcohol warning
legislation, they should give little or no deference to Hon and Brune
because of the many problems inherent in the reasoning and application of those decisions.1 95 Alternatively, courts should follow the lead
of the Restatement"96 and the majority of cases197 which conclude,
as a matter of law, that manufacturers need not warn, since the ordinary consumer is sufficiently aware of the health hazards associated
with consuming alcoholic beverages.
When courts entertain failure to warn suits and permit plaintiffs
to reach the jury, courts are, in essence, requiring manufacturers to
voluntarily place warnings on their products. The threat of insurmountable liability resting upon the unpredictable discretion of a
jury is too great a risk for manufacturers to remain idle. Moreover,
this type of voluntary self-assessment system is problematic because
manufacturers are given no standards by which to judge the adequacy of their warnings. A warning designed to address facts
presented in a prior case, where a court permitted the issue to reach
a jury, may not adequately cover situations arising in future cases. 98
193. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text (discussing the implied preemption
of state claims challenging the adequacy of alcohol warning labels).
194.

See supra note 14 and accompanying text.

195. See supra notes 138-66, 172-92 and accompanying text.
196. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comments h, i & j (1965); see also
sources cited supra note 89, 90 (discussing the Restatement authors' reference to alcoholic

beverages as products which are neither defective, nor unreasonably dangerous).
197. See supra notes 92-124 and accompanying text.
198. For instance, a warning deemed adequate by the jury in a previous case may nevertheless be found inadequate in factually similar future cases due to the inherent inconsistentcies of jury verdicts. Cf. Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980). In Dawson, a police officer brought a products liability suit against the patrol car manufacturer for

injuries sustained when the car slid into an "unyielding steel pole." Id. at 954. The police
officer alleged that the patrol car was defective for lack of a continuous steel frame, and that

the defect was the proximate cause of his injuries. Id. Despite the manufacturer's contention
that it complied with the safety standards promulgated by Congress under the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, the Third Circuit noted that the Act expressly provided that
compliance would not exempt manufacturers from liability under common law. Id. at 958. The
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Hence, even if manufacturers were to provide warnings to consumers, they would not be shielded from future liability. Instead, manufacturers would continually remain uncertain as to whether their
warnings were adequate to cover the range of potential situations
which might arise from future plaintiffs' abuses of their products.
As a result of the likelihood that a court may permit plaintiffs'
failure to warn cases to reach a jury, manufacturers will likely
counter with one of two types of warnings, both of which are potentially troublesome. First, manufacturers may choose to provide more
detailed warnings only in those states which allow plaintiffs' claims
to go to the jury, and only to the extent necessary to cover the situations presented by those cases. This stems from the premise that
manufacturers would not warn consumers unnecessarily of the
health hazards associated with consuming their products.199 Essentially, manufacturers would be subject to different warning requirements in different states, resulting in a significant burden on interstate commerce.200 In addition, each time a case presenting a new
consumption situation was permitted to reach the jury, manufacturers might be forced to change their warnings. Making continuous
changes to health warning labels could prove to be both confusing to
consumers and burdensome on interstate commerce. 20 '
court recognized the problems inherent in permitting a jury to determine the scope of the term
"defective product." While the Dawson jury held the manufacturer liable for failing to produce a rigid enough frame, the court noted that a jury in a future case might very well hold
the manufacturer liable for constructing a frame which is too rigid. Id. at 962. The court
stated:
In effect, this permits individual juries ... in different jurisdictions to set nationwide
automobile safety standards and to impose on automobile manufacturers conflicting
requirements. It would be difficult for members of the industry to alter their design
and production behavior in response to jury verdicts in such cases, because their
response might well be at variance with what some other jury decides is a defective
design. Under these circumstances, the law imposes on the industry the responsibility of insuring vast numbers of persons....
Id. Accordingly, the court determined that permitting individual juries to impose varying obligations on manufacturers is neither fair, nor efficient. Id. at 963.
199. See Sanders, supra note 2, at C2, col. 3 (arguing that there is no need for alcohol
warning labels).
200. One of Congress' purposes behind enacting the Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of
1988 was to protect commerce and the national economy from being impeded by "diverse,
nonuniform, and confusing" warning requirements. 27 U.S.C.A. § 213(2)(B) (West Supp.
1989); supra note 62 (setting forth Congress' legislative purpose); see also SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 38, at 5.
201. Cf. 27 U.S.C.A. § 213(2)(B) (West Supp. 1989) (providing that commerce and the
national economy should not be impeded by confusing and misleading alcoholic warning labels); SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 38, at 5.
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A second alternative would be for manufacturers to provide a
single extensive warning. Although manufacturers ordinarily would
prefer not to provide such a warning, they may nevertheless be
forced to, in order to protect themselves from irrational and inconsistent jury verdicts. The labels would warn consumers of the wide array of potential health hazards which could result from varying degrees of consumption. Apart from the need for a booklet to
accompany each bottle of alcohol sold, the warnings might become
inaccurate, misleading and ineffective. 2 As a result, in an effort for
manufacturers to adequately protect themselves, manufacturers may
begin to warn consumers of potential injuries which are not yet scientifically proven, in order to counter evidence introduced through
future plaintiffs' expert witnesses.
The result of either of the two alternatives above is to completely abrogate Congress' desire for uniformity of alcoholic beverage warning labels.20 As a result, the requisite specificity of health
warning labels on alcoholic beverages is a decision best left for Congressional determination. Imposing stricter warnings involves more
than a jury's myopic look at common knowledge or a manufacturers'
blind attempts to insulate themselves from liability.0 4 Should
202. Cf. 27 U.S.C.A. § 213(2)(B) (West Supp. 1989); SENATE CoMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 38, at 5.
203. See supra note 61-69 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' desire for national uniformity in alcoholic beverage warning labels and the likely effects that voluntary selfimposed warning labels will have on the effectiveness of federal labeling legislation).
204. For example, Congress can determine whether stricter warnings will have a negative impact on the state of warnings in general, see ALCOHOL REPORT, supra note 38, at 41;
see also supra note 38 (discussing the report's findings regarding the effects alcoholic beverage
labels will have on the current state of product warnings), or whether they will act as a forbidden fruit-enticing adolescents to "take the dare," see Sanders, supra note 2, at C2, col. 3; see
also Olin, This Dud'sfor You, 119 NEw REPUBLIC 12 (July 11, 1988) (stating the arguments
of those opposed to alcohol warning legislation).
It should be noted that when courts are faced with cases whose ultimate resolution involves policy considerations far beyond the scope of judicial determination, many have deferred
resolution of the issue to the legislature. For example, many courts have refused to recognize a
cause of action against social hosts for negligently furnishing alcoholic beverages to intoxicated
guests. These courts have recognized that adopting social host liability might result in subjecting hosts to limitless liability and, as a result, could dramatically affect social behavior. Because of these policy considerations, the courts rationalized that any change in the law should
be made by the legislature. See, e.g., Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65 (1976)
(noting that the legislature can hold hearings and debates, and should it determine that a
change in the law is necessary, it can draft legislation which balances the interests of all parties); Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (holding that policies are best weighed in the legislative process after hearings and investigations); Garren v.
Cummings & McGrady, Inc., 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508 (Ct. App. 1986) (noting that
since the legislature is able to invite public participation, it is better suited to conduct the
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stricter warnings be deemed necessary, Congress, unlike the judiciary, has the power to conduct hearings and debates in order to determine the exact wording necessary to communicate a clear and accurate message.2 5 Moreover, federal warning legislation promotes
uniformity. Uniform warning requirements would alleviate the
problems of confusion and burdens on interstate commerce which
would inevitably result from allowing failure to warn claims to reach
the jury.2 06
George Arthur Davis

analysis required).
205. See 27 U.S.C.A. § 213 (West Supp. 1989) (stating that Congress' intention to
provide a clear, nonconfusing reminder of the hazards associated with consuming alcohol, and
recognizing a need for national uniformity in such warnings in order to prevent the promulgation of inaccurate and misleading information).
206. Cf supra note 62 (discussing Congress' purpose behind enacting the Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of 1988).
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